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matthew c. stephenson 
The Price of Public Action: 
Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation 
of Legislative Enactment Costs 
abstract.  This Article argues that courts can, and often should, implement constitutional 
guarantees by crafting doctrines that raise the costs to government decisionmakers of enacting 
constitutionally problematic policies. This indirect approach may implement a kind of implicit 
balancing of interests, in which the damage to constitutional values is weighed against the 
strength of the government’s interest in the challenged policy, more effectively than alternative 
approaches. When the government has better information than the reviewing court about the 
effect of the challenged policy on constitutionally relevant interests, heightened enactment costs 
act as a kind of screening device: if the government would still enact a given policy in the face of 
substantial additional enactment costs, the probability that the policy serves significant 
government interests is likely to be higher. This Article first develops the theoretical argument as 
to how (and under what conditions) doctrines that manipulate legislative enactment costs may 
be more effective tools for judicial implementation of the Constitution than doctrines that 
require direct judicial assessment of the relative strength of the competing interests. The Article 
further contends that the federal judiciary already has the capacity to fashion doctrines that 
function in this way, and indeed current doctrine influences legislative enactment costs more 
than has generally been appreciated. 
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introduction 
In the most famous sentence in all of American constitutional 
jurisprudence, Chief Justice Marshall declared, “It is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”
1 Though 
susceptible of  multiple readings, Justice Marshall’s statement succinctly 
captures a particular view of how constitutional judicial review operates. 
According to this view, pervasive in much legal scholarship and commentary, 
some set of government actions is prohibited by “the law”; it is the duty of the 
courts to identify and to police the boundaries of that set; and anything that 
falls outside of the judicially defined set of prohibited actions is permissible.
2 
This Article contends that the focus on direct judicial assessment and 
enforcement of constitutional limits obscures important ways in which courts 
implement constitutional guarantees indirectly. Specifically, I argue that courts 
often can, do, and should craft doctrines that raise the costs to government 
decisionmakers of enacting constitutionally problematic policies, rather than 
attempting to designate certain government actions, or categories of 
government actions, as permissible or impermissible.
3 
 
1.   Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
2.  See,  e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (declaring that the 
purpose of constitutional rights is “to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of 
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to 
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts”); United States v. Butler, 297 
U.S. 1, 62 (1936) (stating that a court’s task when evaluating a constitutional challenge to a 
congressional statute is “to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the 
statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former”); see 
also Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term—Foreword: Antidiscrimination and 
Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80, 
82, 109-10 (1991) (claiming that “much of the academic constitutional law establishment” 
believes in a decisive judicial role in defining and enforcing constitutional rights against 
government action); Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental 
Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1578-79 
& n.8 (2001) (discussing the prevalence of this all-or-nothing view of constitutional rights); 
Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2781, 2781, 2784 (2003) 
(observing that traditional debates in U.S. constitutional law and theory are predicated on 
the belief that the United States has “strong-form” judicial review, in which the Supreme 
Court issues authoritative statements of what the Constitution requires that are absolutely 
binding on the other branches). 
3.   My argument is closely related to Professor Ernest Young’s defense of the canon of 
constitutional avoidance as a “resistance norm” of constitutional law, which seeks to enforce 
constitutional values in a different manner than a more conventional “invalidation norm.” 
See Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of 
Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1552 (2000) (“[N]ot all constitutional principles have a 
‘line in the sand’ quality, such that all government acts short of that line are valid and all STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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The advantage of this sort of indirect strategy, as compared with a 
categorical approach that seeks to classify government actions as lawful or 
unlawful, is that it may implement a kind of implicit balancing of interests. In 
that balancing, the damage to constitutional values is weighed against the 
strength of the government’s interest in the challenged policy more effectively 
than under a direct judicial balancing test. When the government has better 
information than the reviewing court about the effect of the challenged policy 
on constitutionally relevant interests, heightened enactment costs act as a kind 
 
government acts falling over that line are invalid. Rather, some constitutional principles take 
the form of ‘resistance norms’—norms that may be more or less yielding to governmental 
action, depending on the strength of the government’s interest [or other factors].”); see also 
id. at 1594 (developing this point further). My position is also consonant with Professor Dan 
Coenen’s conclusion that much of constitutional adjudication makes use of 
“semisubstantive” or “second-look” decision rules rather than all-or-nothing rules, see 
Coenen,  supra note 2; Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, Structural Due Process, and 
Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281 (2002), as well as Professor 
Henry Monaghan’s classic explication and defense of “constitutional common law,” see 
Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 
89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975). The argument also builds on my earlier work, primarily in the 
administrative law context, on how procedural hurdles or explanatory requirements can 
provide costly signals to overseers about the underlying value that agents attach to their 
policy proposals. See Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” 
Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753 (2006) [hereinafter Stephenson, Costly Signaling]; 
Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility, Procedural 
Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations, 120 HARV.  L.  REV. 528 
(2006) [hereinafter Stephenson, Strategic Substitution]. Professor Jonathan Masur has 
recently suggested how a similar sort of screening mechanism may account for seemingly 
ineffective and expensive procedural requirements in the patent context and elsewhere. See 
Jonathan S. Masur, Process as Purpose: Administrative Procedure, Costly Screens, and 
Examination at the Patent Office (July 20, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author). 
      My argument is also connected to recent developments in the political science 
literature on delegation. Much of the delegation literature traditionally analyzed regimes in 
which a political principal defines some “discretionary window” in which an agent had 
absolute authority. See Jonathan Bendor & Adam Meirowitz, Spatial Models of Delegation, 98 
AM.  POL.  SCI.  REV.  293 (2004); David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Administrative 
Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 697 (1994); Thomas W. 
Gilligan & Keith Krehbiel, Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature, 34 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 531 (1990). More recent work has pointed out, however, that the principal 
would often do better by using a “menu law,” in which the agent receives variable transfer 
payments (or avoids unpleasant sanctions or costs) that depend on the agent’s choice. See 
Sean Gailmard, Discretion Rather Than Rules: Choice of Instruments To Constrain Bureaucratic 
Policy-Making, 17 POL. ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2008); see also David P. Baron, Legislative 
Organization with Informational Committees, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 485 (2000) (discussing a 
similar control strategy in the context of congressional committees). This menu law strategy 
offers the principal more flexibility in fine-tuning the incentives of the agent, and so it is 
generally preferable so long as it is feasible for the principal. See Gailmard, supra. STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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of screening device: if the government would still enact a given policy in the 
face of substantial additional enactment costs, the probability that the policy 
serves significant government interests is likely to be higher. 
In a sense, this is a kind of constitutional law analogue to the well-known 
concept of “efficient breach” in contract law.
4 It would be possible for courts to 
fashion contract law doctrines—presumptions, balancing tests, and the like—to 
help them determine which contractual provisions ought to be enforceable 
under what conditions, and to enforce these determinations through 
injunctions. The norm in contract law, however, is to compel the breaching 
party to pay damages.
5 The logic is that the contracting parties usually have 
better information than the court about the relative economic values of breach 
and performance, so a liability rule is more likely to prevent inefficient 
breaches, while allowing efficient breaches. In a similar fashion, constitutional 
doctrines that raise the costs associated with problematic government 
enactments may help deter policies that are “inefficient”—in the broad sense of 
failing a hypothetical ideal constitutional balancing test—while allowing what 
might be thought of as “efficient breaches” of constitutional rights.
6 
This Article has two main objectives. Part I explains, as a theoretical matter, 
how, why, and under what conditions judicial doctrines that manipulate 
enactment costs may be more effective tools for judicial implementation of the 
Constitution than doctrines that require direct judicial assessment of the 
relative strength of the competing interests at stake.
7 Part II argues that the 
federal judiciary already has the capacity to fashion doctrines that function in 
this way; indeed, current doctrine affects legislative enactment costs more than 
has generally been appreciated. Although manipulation of legislative enactment 
 
4.  See John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 
277 (1972); Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic 
Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273 (1970); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated 
Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model 
and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977). 
5.  R ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, topic 3, introductory note (1981). 
6.   While the efficient breach analogy may be a useful heuristic in understanding the incentive 
effects of constitutional doctrines that alter government enactment costs, the two situations 
are different in several crucial respects. For example, in the contractual setting, the costs 
imposed on the breaching party are redistributed to the other party, which implies that the 
social costs of imposing the damages remedy are usually small. Typically, judicially-imposed 
government enactment costs do not involve a redistribution of wealth from the legislature to 
some other party, so the social costs of the enactment cost strategy in constitutional law will 
generally be higher. 
7.   For a general discussion of how judicial doctrines can be understood as mechanisms for 
implementing the Constitution, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—
Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1997). STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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costs may not be the intended or primary effect of any doctrine in 
constitutional law, it is an important function of many such doctrines. 
Furthermore, some doctrines might be justified as means of manipulating 
legislative enactment costs, even if this was never their intended function. 
Understanding both the theory of enactment cost manipulation and the 
ways in which existing constitutional doctrines may influence legislative 
enactment costs may be useful in evaluating the advantages and disadvantages 
of these doctrines, as well as in suggesting alternative doctrinal strategies for 
implementing the Constitution. By thinking more systematically about these 
issues, one may be able to craft doctrines that more effectively leverage the 
advantages associated with an enactment cost strategy while minimizing the 
inevitable shortcomings of such an approach. 
i.    the theory of enactment cost manipulation 
A. The Inevitability of Balancing and the Problem of Uncertainty 
Constitutional review of government action pervasively, perhaps inevitably, 
requires some form of balancing.
8 In virtually all hard constitutional cases, 
some privileged right, interest, or entitlement comes into conflict with a 
normatively attractive competing government interest.
9 The need to balance 
constitutional values against competing interests is apparent in the text of some 
constitutional clauses, such as the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on 
“unreasonable” searches and seizures and the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments’ requirement of “due” process. Other clauses, such as the First 
Amendment’s Speech and Religion Clauses and the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause, appear to embody more absolute prohibitions. But in 
practice, when defining the underlying right that is protected “absolutely” and 
in specifying the remedies available, courts have recognized the need to balance 
competing values and interests.
10 
 
8.  See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L. REV. 343 
(1993); Fallon, supra note 7; Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 
1960 SUP. CT. REV. 75, 78-80. But see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of 
Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987). 
9.  See Fallon, supra note 8; Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Government Interests: An Essential 
but Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917 (1988); Symposium, 
Conference on Compelling Government Interests: The Mystery of Constitutional Analysis, 55 ALB. 
L. REV. 535 (1992). 
10.  See David L. Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government Interests: Madisonian 
Principles Versus Supreme Court Practice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1521, 1547-63 (1992); Fallon, supra STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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This is not to assert that all constitutional doctrines involve some form of 
case-by-case, totality-of-the-circumstances balancing, nor that they should. As 
an empirical matter, pure balancing tests are relatively rare (though certainly 
not absent) in constitutional law.
11 As a normative matter, scholars of various 
ideological stripes have argued against the wisdom of doctrines that call for 
judges to engage in all-things-considered, case-specific balancing.
12 Yet in 
those areas in which courts reject case-by-case “retail” balancing of 
constitutional values and competing interests, they typically engage in a kind of 
“wholesale” balancing when formulating or refining their doctrinal 
approaches.
13 For example, a judicial decision that a category of government 
action is presumptively lawful or unlawful, or that certain types of controversy 
are nonjusticiable, implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) rests on a judgment 
about how to strike the appropriate balance between some constitutionally 
protected value and the government’s interest in advancing legitimate public 
policy objectives.
14 Similarly, when courts decide that certain categories of 
government action will be subject to relatively forgiving “rational basis” 
review, while other categories will have to meet a more demanding level of 
scrutiny, these classification decisions typically involve probabilistic judgments 
about the likely costs and benefits of actions within the specified categories.
15 
Thus, rejection of retail balancing in individual cases generally implies 
wholesale balancing in the creation of doctrinal tests to implement 
constitutional guarantees. 
To assert that constitutional adjudication and doctrinal formulation require 
balancing constitutional values against legitimate competing interests is to 
frame the problem faced by the courts, not to resolve it. How are courts to 
strike the appropriate balance? How are they to devise doctrinal frameworks 
that maximize the chances that an appropriate balance will be struck? This 
problem is especially acute given that courts face two well-known institutional 
 
note 8, at 361-64; Karst, supra note 8, at 78-80; Daryl Levinson, Rights Essentialism and 
Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999). 
11.  See Fallon, supra note 7, at 76. 
12.  See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 135-66 (1991) (arguing in favor of rule-
based decisionmaking on fairness, reliance, and efficiency grounds); Aleinikoff, supra note 8, 
at 972-95; Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community, and the Judicial Balance: The 
Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1, 56-60 (1987); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against 
Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1697, 1700-02 (1988); Antonin 
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). 
13.  See Fallon, supra note 8, at 361-65; Fallon, supra note 7, at 77-78. 
14.  See Faigman, supra note 10, at 1547-63; Fallon, supra note 8, at 361-64; Richard H. Fallon, 
Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274 (2006). 
15.  See Fallon, supra note 7. STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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limitations. First, the federal judiciary’s lack of direct electoral accountability 
raises questions about the extent to which courts may make value-laden 
judgments about the validity and relative importance of alleged constitutional 
rights and competing government interests. Alexander Bickel famously dubbed 
this legitimacy problem the “countermajoritarian difficulty,”
16 and 
constitutional theorists have debated it ad nauseum for a half-century since.
17 
Even if one brackets or rejects the legitimacy objection to judicial review, 
courts still face a second institutional problem: their comparative disadvantage 
in gathering and evaluating information about the connection between policies 
and outcomes. It is not enough to assign normative weight to constitutionally 
protected values and competing government interests in the abstract. One 
must also assess the likely consequences of the challenged government action 
for those values and interests.
18 Yet judges may not be especially good at 
making these sorts of empirical or predictive judgments, and that creates 
problems independent of the normative legitimacy of countermajoritarian 
judicial review.
19 
To illustrate the distinction between the legitimacy problem and the 
information problem, consider a stylized example. Imagine that a speaker in a 
public park is delivering a racist rant to a large crowd, and the police detain 
him pursuant to a statute that proscribes speech that is likely to incite racial 
violence. Now suppose (unrealistically) that the court reviewing the case could 
be certain that the probability that this speech (or this type of speech) would 
actually cause a race riot is fifteen percent. The example thus assumes away the 
court’s information problem. The legitimacy problem remains, however. If the 
 
16.  A LEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR 
OF POLITICS 16-17 (1962). 
17.  See Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE  L.J. 153 (2002); Barry Friedman, The 
Counter-Majoritarian Problem and the Pathology of Constitutional Scholarship, 95 NW. U. L. 
REV. 933 (2001). 
18.  See Karst, supra note 8, at 81, 84. 
19.  See Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 
199, 209 (1971); Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A 
Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1178-82 (2001); Fallon, supra note 8, at 376. This 
information problem may arise because the professional background and training of judges, 
coupled with the comparative institutional insulation of the judiciary, makes courts 
systematically worse than a legislature or executive at assimilating empirical data and 
making factual predictions. The lack of electoral accountability may also mean the courts are 
more likely to err in assessing the impact of various statutory proposals on the welfare of 
relevant constituencies. But see Devins, supra, at 1182-86 (suggesting that, even if Congress 
has a superior institutional capacity to make predictive empirical judgments, it may lack 
appropriate institutional incentives to gather and use factual information appropriately). STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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court were to hold that the statute is unconstitutional, one might reasonably 
ask why an unelected court is entitled to decide that a fifteen percent chance of 
a race riot is not high enough to prohibit inflammatory speech when the 
democratically elected legislature reached a different conclusion. Responding 
to this challenge is especially difficult if we concede that there is some point at 
which the risk of violence is so great that prohibiting the speech would be 
justified. (Imagine, again unrealistically, that the court knew with absolute 
certainty that this speech, if allowed, would trigger a city-wide race riot in 
which hundreds would die.) If we make that concession, then we have 
admitted the need for some sort of balancing. Yet how confident can we be that 
the court will strike the balance at the right point? Should a fifteen percent risk 
of a riot be sufficient to restrain speech? Five percent? Thirty percent? There 
are good reasons to worry about whether courts will assign the correct 
normative weight to the competing interests. 
Now, consider a variant on the same example in which the legitimacy 
problem is assumed away but the information problem is present. Suppose 
that the court both would and should find the hypothetical statute 
unconstitutional as applied if, but only if, the probability that the targeted 
speech would incite a riot is less than twenty percent. That is, the government 
interest in public safety outweighs the speaker’s autonomy and self-expression 
interests only if the probability of inciting a riot is greater than twenty percent. 
Even if there is no normative legitimacy problem with allowing the court to 
enforce that principle, the court is likely to be quite uncertain as to the true 
probability that the speech in question might cause a riot. Furthermore, even 
though the government, the defendant, and other interested parties might have 
better information on this point, they have an incentive to exaggerate in 
whichever direction favors their interests: the defendant’s attorney will insist 
that the probability of this speech inciting violence was very low, while the 
government will insist that it was very high. The court will need to come up 
with some way to sift through the competing arguments and evidence and 
make the judgment that minimizes the aggregate error costs. 
This simple pair of examples illustrates the conceptual distinction between 
concerns about courts’ ability to correctly assign normative weight to 
constitutional values and competing government interests, and limitations on 
courts’ capacity to evaluate the degree to which those values and interests are 
implicated by a given government action. In real life, the distinction is more 
elusive, and the degree to which a judicial decision or doctrine reflects a court’s 
normative judgment about the relative importance of different interests, rather 
than an empirical prediction about the probable effect of the challenged policy STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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on the relevant values, may not always be clear.
20 Nonetheless, there is an 
important conceptual distinction between the objection that courts are 
unqualified to make value determinations (the legitimacy problem) and the 
objection that they are unqualified to assess (or predict) relevant facts (the 
information problem). 
That distinction is important for purposes of this Article because the focus 
here is primarily on doctrinal solutions to the judiciary’s information problem. 
As in the second version of the hypothetical hate speech case, the Article 
assumes away concerns about whether the courts assign the appropriate level 
of normative significance to various rights, values, and interests. This is not 
because these concerns are unimportant, nor because the judiciary’s ability to 
make contested normative value judgments is unproblematic. But this Article’s 
central arguments principally concern the doctrinal strategies that courts can 
employ to ameliorate their informational limitations. In exploring that issue, 
bracketing the legitimacy objection simplifies the analysis and exposition. 
 
B. Enactment Costs and the Implementation of the Constitution 
This Article’s central claim is that judicial doctrines can raise the costs to 
legislators
21 of enacting a given policy, thereby increasing the probability that 
policies subsequently enacted would satisfy a hypothetical ideal balancing test 
of constitutional values against competing government interests. The 
argument is not simply that judicial doctrines can reduce the total quantity of 
constitutionally problematic legislation by imposing an implicit tax on such 
legislation, though that is certainly one effect of doctrines that raise legislative 
enactment costs. Rather, I advance the stronger claim that judicial imposition 
of additional enactment costs on legislatures enables courts to reduce their 
comparative informational disadvantage. The better-informed government 
decisionmakers will only be willing to act when their true interest in the policy 
is sufficiently strong; government exaggeration of its true interest becomes a 
less viable strategy. Thus, courts may be able to approximate indirectly the 
outcomes that would be achieved by an ideal (but practically 
unimplementable) constitutional balancing test. 
 
20.  See David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring the Empirical 
Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 544, 546 (1991) (claiming 
that the “Court fails to distinguish between normative principles and empirical 
propositions” and noting the Court’s traditional “casual interweaving of fact and law”). 
21.   The same analysis applies to other government decisionmakers, including the President, law 
enforcement officials, and administrative agencies. The textual focus on legislative 
decisionmaking is purely for expositional convenience. STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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The idea can be illustrated with another stylized example. Imagine that 
Congress is considering a statute that would advance some legitimate 
government interest but that would also injure some constitutional value. For 
concreteness, imagine a statute that would impose new regulatory obligations 
on Internet service providers. Proponents of the legislation justify it in terms of 
some legitimate public interest, such as eliminating online copyright 
infringement or protecting national security by blocking or monitoring the 
transmission of classified government information. The statute, however, may 
also threaten values protected by the Constitution, such as speech rights or 
privacy rights. 
Securing passage of the statute requires effort on the part of supportive 
legislators and interest groups. This is true even for legislative proposals that 
are relatively simple and uncontroversial, a n d  i t  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  t r u e  f o r  m o r e  
complex or divisive proposals. The costs to legislators and interest groups of 
drafting and enacting legislation, other than the disadvantages of the 
legislation itself, are primarily opportunity costs. Legislators have limited time, 
staff, and political capital to allocate to a variety of activities, including not only 
legislation but also oversight, constituency service, campaigning, and public 
relations activities. A rational legislator will allocate her limited resources 
among these activities so as to maximize her ability to achieve her objectives, 
which will typically include reelection or career advancement, ideological or 
policy goals, prestige, and leisure.
22 Therefore, when a legislator considers 
whether to work toward the enactment of a given bill, such as the hypothetical 
Internet regulation statute, she will consider not only how passage of that 
statute would benefit her, but also the opportunity costs of devoting resources 
to that bill rather than to other activities. Interest groups typically face a similar 
kind of tradeoff: effort devoted to securing the passage of any one legislative 
proposal is effort that cannot be devoted to some other valued activity. 
Legislation will be enacted only if a sufficient number of influential players 
believe that the net political and policy benefits associated with the legislation 
outweigh the opportunity costs of devoting sufficient effort to ensure passage. 
Suppose that the benefits to legislators and interest groups of passing the 
hypothetical Internet regulation statute exceed the costs, so that the statute is 
enacted into law. The statute might then be challenged on constitutional 
grounds. If a court composed of omniscient judges were able to apply an ideal 
constitutional balancing test, it would uphold the statute if and only if the 
legitimate government interests in enacting the statute (such as fostering 
 
22.  See,  e.g., BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA ET AL., THE LOGIC OF POLITICAL SURVIVAL 21-23 (2003); 
RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS 137 (1978). STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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innovation or defending against threats to national security) outweigh the 
injury to constitutionally significant values (such as speech and privacy).
23 
Alternatively, if the court were confident that the legislature would always fully 
internalize the costs and benefits of its decisions, then judicial review would be 
superfluous, because the court, even if not omniscient, would always uphold 
the decisions of the wise and benevolent legislature. 
Problems arise, however, if the judiciary has incomplete information and 
the legislature has misaligned incentives.
24 The legislature may undervalue the 
constitutional interests at stake—or, equivalently, it may overvalue the 
competing benefits. In other words, the private benefit of enacting the statute 
may exceed the private enactment cost for a sufficient number of legislators 
and interest groups, even though the social benefit of the statute is less than its 
social cost. When this is the case, the legislature may favor statutes that would 
fail the hypothetical ideal balancing test. If the reviewing court were 
omniscient, or at least had information as good as the legislature’s about the 
statute’s likely effects, the court could still constrain the legislature through the 
application of the ideal constitutional balancing test. But if the court’s 
information about the issues at stake is not as good as the legislature’s, the 
court’s problem is much more difficult. 
To illustrate, assume that the court can confidently assess the degree to 
which the hypothetical Internet regulation statute impinges on constitutionally 
privileged speech and privacy rights, but the court’s information about the 
statute’s relationship to competing government interests—intellectual property 
protection, national security, or what have you—is significantly worse than the 
legislature’s. To make the information problem as stark as possible, albeit at 
the price of some descriptive realism, assume that the legislature (considered as 
a unitary actor
25) knows the public benefit of the statute with certainty even 
 
23.   The judge could do even better if she could credibly commit in advance to uphold only 
statutes for which the public benefits exceed the sum of the constitutional costs and the 
social opportunity costs of enactment. Credible commitment would be necessary because, at 
the moment the statute comes before the court, enactment costs are sunk. 
24.  Yet more problems arise if the judiciary has misaligned incentives and the legislature’s 
information is no better than the court’s. Serious as those problems are, I put them aside for 
purposes of developing this Article’s central theoretical argument. 
25.   The theoretical difficulties with treating a multi-member body as a unitary decisionmaker 
are well known. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951); 
Richard D. McKelvey, Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications 
for Agenda Control, 12 J. ECON. THEORY 472 (1976); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” 
Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992). This Article, 
however, neither assumes a single legislative intent or will, nor relies on the assumption that 
all members of the legislature have the same information. Rather, this Article assumes that STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
the yale law journal  118:2  2008 
14 
 
though it may undervalue the constitutional interests at stake, while the 
reviewing court, despite having exactly the right values, can only make a rough 
estimate of the statute’s impact on legitimate public interests. 
If the reviewing court had to rely only on its own information, it would 
have to decide whether the expected public benefit of the statute—given the 
court’s incomplete information—is greater or less than the cost to 
constitutional values.
26 The court could apply a kind of retail balancing test or, 
alternatively, some other doctrinal formula that the court believes will achieve 
an appropriate constitutional balance at the wholesale level. But these 
approaches entail substantial error costs. The court’s uninformed application of 
the relevant test may prevent the enactment of socially desirable, 
constitutionally justifiable legislation. After all, the true social benefit of the 
statute may be much larger than the court’s estimate of the expected benefit. 
On the other hand, the court may end up approving a statute that inflicts an 
unjustifiably large injury to constitutionally protected values, if it turns out that 
the actual benefit of the statute is much lower than the expected benefit. 
This dilemma is a well-known problem with judicial attempts to balance 
constitutional and other public values, whether at the retail level or the 
wholesale level. The question therefore arises whether there are better ways 
that the court can implement constitutional values, instead of a direct but 
uninformed inquiry into the effect of a challenged statute on constitutionally 
relevant values and interests. Is it possible for the court to establish doctrinal 
mechanisms that induce outcomes that more closely approximate those of a 
hypothetical ideal constitutional balancing test? 
There are a number of ways that the courts might attempt to achieve such a 
result. One strategy targets the problem of misaligned legislative incentives, 
developing doctrines designed to induce greater legislative deliberation or to 
limit the influence of parochial interest groups.
27 Another approach is to 
 
the legislature employs some set of institutional arrangements that generate stable 
equilibrium policy choices, see, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle, Institutional Arrangements and 
Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 27 (1979), and that the 
equilibrium policy choice is affected by information that members of the legislature receive 
and process concerning the impact of various policies on some normatively relevant set of 
outcomes. Characterizing the legislature, or the enacting coalition, as a unitary actor that 
“knows” the effect of policies on outcomes and chooses the policy that would advance “its” 
interest is a shorthand way of describing this more complex collective choice process. 
26.  Again, if the court could commit to a decision rule ahead of time, it would uphold the 
statute only if the expected public benefit exceeded the sum of the constitutional costs and 
the social opportunity costs of enactment. 
27.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985) 
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establish doctrinal tests that elicit more accurate and credible information from 
the legislature about the public interests at stake, for example by demanding 
certain types of evidentiary showings or information disclosure.
28 An 
alternative or complementary strategy, and the one on which this Article 
focuses, is to formulate doctrines that establish indirect mechanisms that 
credibly transfer information from the legislature to the court. One such 
approach is to increase the costs to the legislature of enacting constitutionally 
problematic legislation. 
To see how this strategy could work, consider a case in which the 
legislature, though better informed than the court, systematically undervalues 
constitutionally privileged interests, or overvalues competing government 
objectives. Under this assumption, the private cost to legislators of enacting a 
given statute—the opportunity costs of enactment, plus the other perceived 
disadvantages of the law—may be smaller than the statute’s social costs, 
including its impact on constitutional values. If, however, the opportunity cost 
of enacting the statute were to increase to the point at which the statute’s 
private cost to a decisive legislative coalition were equal to the true social cost, 
then the legislature would never enact a statute with negative net social value. 
The legislature, however, would still pass the legislation if the private benefit to 
a decisive coalition were sufficiently high. Enactment costs thus function as a 
screening device, deterring legislative action with low private benefit to the 
legislature. 
Because all legislative activity entails opportunity costs, some screening will 
take place even without judicial intervention. Furthermore, the legislative 
process laid down in Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution—which requires 
the assent of both houses of Congress plus the President, or two-thirds of each 
house if the President is in opposition—might itself be considered a device for 
raising the enactment costs of legislation, thereby helping to ensure that any 
legislation that makes it through this process is perceived by a sufficiently large 
number of legislators and interest groups not just as having some positive 
 
parochial interests by inducing greater deliberation by legislatures); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984) (arguing that much 
constitutional doctrine can be understood as a means to prohibit legislative action intended 
to benefit particular interest groups rather than to serve the public interest). 
28.  Cf. Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory 
Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137 (2001) (applying a model in which cost-benefit analysis 
entails disclosure of information about policy effects by a better-informed agent to a less-
informed political principal); Matthew C. Stephenson, Evidentiary Standards and Information 
Acquisition in Public Law, AM.  L.  &  ECON.  REV. (forthcoming 2008) (considering how 
judicial demands for certain types of evidentiary showings affect government 
decisionmakers’ incentives to acquire information). STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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value, but as having substantial positive value.
29 If the existing screen is not 
sufficiently powerful to filter out enough undesirable statutes, though, the 
courts can try to find ways to make the screen more demanding. One way for 
the courts to do this is by developing doctrines that raise enactment costs for 
those statutes for which the legislature is likely to overvalue the statute’s 
benefits relative to its costs. The court’s manipulation of legislative enactment 
costs enables it to extract more information from the legislature about the true 
public benefit of the statute in question. Even if the court cannot verify the 
government’s assertions regarding the legislation’s benefits, the magnitude of 
the enactment cost forces the government to credibly reveal some of its private 
information indirectly through its behavior. Judicial doctrines that raise the 
government’s enactment cost thus increase the credibility of the government’s 
assertion that it has a sufficiently strong interest in the legislation to justify the 
injury to constitutionally privileged values. 
C. The Theory’s Domain 
In order for judicial doctrine to perform the hypothesized screening 
function described in the preceding section, four critical assumptions must 
hold. First, the relevant government policymakers’ private interest in enacting 
a policy must be positively correlated (in expectation) with some normatively 
legitimate social interest, even though the government’s interest in enacting the 
policy is systematically too strong. Second, the enacting legislative coalition 
must have better information about the expected impact of the policy than does 
the reviewing court, but the court must have reasonably good information 
about the enacting coalition’s policy preferences. Third, the court must be able 
to fashion doctrines that increase the private opportunity cost of enactment for 
the decisive legislative coalition by more than these doctrines increase the social 
opportunity cost of enactment. Fourth, judicial doctrine must be capable of 
imposing enactment costs that are large enough to decrease the government’s 
willingness to pursue the targeted class of policy decisions. 
This Article does not claim that all of these assumptions always hold. 
Rather, the claim—more modest, but perhaps still controversial—is that they 
 
29.   This beneficial effect of the Constitution’s cumbersome lawmaking procedure (as well as 
other “supermajority” rules) has been advanced and defended in a series of articles by John 
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Majority 
and Supermajority Rules: Three Views of the Capitol, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1115, 1128-37 (2007); John 
O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REV. 
703, 734-43 (2002); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a 
Constitutional Solution, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 365, 407-18 (1999). STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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hold sufficiently often that a functionalist theory of judicial doctrine that 
focuses on manipulation of enactment costs is important to understanding and 
assessing the operation of real-world constitutional review. In order to better 
understand both the theory and the limits to its domain, I will elaborate on 
each of these four key assumptions. 
 
1. Preferences 
The first critical assumption is that the government’s interest in a given 
policy is likely to be positively correlated with the true social interest in that 
policy, but also likely to be too strong. This assumption will hold when the 
government systematically undervalues constitutionally privileged interests, but 
not when the government is excessively hostile to those interests. 
The critical distinction between undervaluation and hostility can be 
illustrated in the context of the Equal Protection Clause’s restriction of race-
based discrimination. Bracket for the moment debates about the legitimacy of 
distilling purposes or values from constitutional texts, as well as controversies 
about the scope and purpose of the Equal Protection Clause. Let us assume, for 
the sake of developing the distinction between undervaluation and hostility, 
that the central purposes of the Equal Protection Clause include the elimination 
of economic, political, and social subjugation of non-white minorities, as well 
as race-based stereotyping and stigmatization.
30 If these are the values the 
Equal Protection Clause is meant to advance, it is reasonable to suppose that 
the Southern legislatures that enacted Jim Crow legislation were hostile to 
these values. The very purpose of Jim Crow, after all, was to perpetuate the 
subordination and stigmatization of African Americans. The more effectively 
segregationist legislation achieved these goals—that is, the more effectively it 
subverted the values embodied by the Equal Protection Clause—the greater its 
appeal to a pro-Jim Crow legislature. 
But not all government action that offends the Equal Protection Clause 
does so because the enacting officials are hostile to the Clause’s values. 
Consider the California prison officials who decided to segregate prisoners on 
 
30.  Many scholars have argued that this, or something like it, is the most plausible 
understanding of the purposes of the Clause. See, e.g., LAURENCE  H.  TRIBE,  AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1514-21 (2d ed. 1988); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection 
Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 157 (1976); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 
MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2429 (1994). This, of course, is a controversial position, but given that 
the example in the text is merely illustrative, it is not necessary for this Article to take a 
position on whether it is correct. STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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the basis of race for their first sixty days in the state penal system.
31 These 
officials asserted that their goal was to reduce the risk of race-based prison 
violence,
32 and there is little reason to doubt their honesty. Indeed, it seems 
implausible that these officials hoped by their actions to perpetuate the 
subordination of non-white minorities or the propagation of negative 
stereotypes about race.
33 It is much more likely either that these officials gave 
no thought to how a presumption in favor of racial segregation would affect 
the dignity of non-white prisoners or the public perception of race as a 
predictor of behavior, or else that these officials believed such negative 
consequences would be outweighed by the benefits of reducing prison violence. 
That does not make the prison segregation policy desirable or 
constitutional. It is quite possible that the prison officials, confronted as they 
were with the immediate and serious risks of violence, undervalued the 
constitutional interests safeguarded by the Equal Protection Clause. 
Insensitivity to these interests may well have led the state to enact an 
unjustifiable policy. But the problem in this case is undervaluation of the 
constitutional interest, not hostility to it. Evidence showing that the prison 
segregation policy would degrade the dignity of African-American prisoners 
more than had been previously supposed would almost certainly have made 
this policy less appealing, not more appealing, to the responsible officials. 
The distinction between undervaluation and hostility is important, not 
least because it highlights the fact that not all, or even most, government 
threats to constitutional rights spring from hostility to constitutional values.
34 
The distinction is particularly important for the theory developed in this 
Article, because a judicial strategy that relies on increasing legislative enactment 
costs will be much more effective when the legislature undervalues 
constitutional interests than when it is hostile to them. In the former case, 
forcing the legislature to show that it is deeply committed to a policy is more 
likely to result in the enactment only of those decisions in which the 
constitutional values at stake really are outweighed by legitimate competing 
interests. In the latter case, intense legislative commitment to a particular 
 
31.  See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005). 
32.  See  id. at 502-03. 
33.  But  see id. at 519 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding a “very real risk that prejudice (whether 
conscious or not) partly underlies the [state officials’] policy”). 
34.   The injury to those values is not necessarily less severe when the cause is undervaluation 
rather than hostility, though there is an ongoing debate about the normative significance of 
“government purpose,” on which this Article takes no position. See J OHN  HART  ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 105-79 (1980); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 
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policy may actually indicate that the injury to constitutionally privileged 
interests is especially severe.
35 
A closely related point is that in order for the enactment cost strategy to 
make sense, there must be a sufficiently close and positive relationship between 
the interests to which the legislature actually responds and the interests that 
can be legitimately balanced against constitutionally protected values. If, for 
example, the legislature is more likely to ban a particular kind of expressive 
conduct if that conduct tends to trigger violence, then raising the costs of 
enacting a statutory ban on such speech is more effective in limiting 
constitutionally problematic legislation to cases in which it is truly justified. If, 
on the other hand, the legislature’s interest in passing the speech-restrictive 
statute is responsive only to normatively irrelevant or disreputable 
considerations, rather than to legitimate government interests, then an 
enactment cost strategy will be less effective. It may succeed in deterring some 
unjustifiable violations of constitutional rights, but it will not be a useful 
filtering or sorting mechanism. 
Thus, one’s assessment of the utility of the enactment cost strategy 
depends considerably on one’s view of the performance of American political 
institutions. If one believes that these institutions, for all their faults, exhibit a 
reasonable degree of positive responsiveness to normatively defensible policy 
interests, then the enactment cost strategy is more sensible. The 
correspondence need not be perfect, nor need it arise because of any intrinsic 
benevolence on the part of policymakers. But, in order for the government’s 
willingness to incur private enactment costs to signal something useful about 
the true public values at stake, the government’s propensity to impinge on 
constitutional interests must be stronger, on average, when the legitimate 
government interests in doing so are more compelling. If one takes the more 
pessimistic view that the outputs of American policymaking institutions are 
generally unrelated to any normatively defensible concept of the public 
interest, then an enactment cost strategy’s viability is greatly diminished, and 
perhaps eliminated. 
 
 2.  Information 
The second critical assumption of the theory concerns information: the 
legislature must have better information about the actual impact of the policy 
in question on relevant interests than does the reviewing court, but the court 
 
35.  Cf. Stephenson, Costly Signaling, supra note 3 (making this theoretical point in the analogous 
context of judicial “hard look” review of administrative agency decisions). STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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must have reasonably good information about legislative preferences. If the 
government does not have superior information about policy effects, then there 
is no asymmetric information problem to solve. If the court does not have at 
least a rough sense of how government preferences and social preferences are 
misaligned, the court cannot compensate for this misalignment by adjusting 
legislative enactment costs. 
Like the assumption that legislative interests are positively responsive to 
public interests, the assumption that legislatures or other government 
decisionmakers have better access to policy-relevant information implicates 
one’s views about the overall performance of American political institutions. 
The more optimistic view is that, although the assumption of perfect 
information made in the stylized examples presented above is an obvious 
exaggeration, legislatures do typically make decisions on the basis of 
information that is not available to a layperson or a reviewing court. Legislators 
need not acquire this information directly, or even consciously process it. 
Responsiveness to information may instead take the form of input from staff, 
constituents, or interest groups. Nonetheless, in the optimistic view, legislative 
action is likely to reflect, at least on average, a more informed judgment about 
the connection between policy choices and actual outcomes.
36 
The more cynical view is that government policymakers either do not know 
or do not care about the connection between policy and outcomes.
37 The 
assertion that they do not care is a claim about incentives, related to the earlier 
discussion concerning legislative responsiveness to public interests. The claim 
that they do not know reflects a belief that the issues are sufficiently complex, 
and the institutional means for information processing sufficiently poor, that 
policy decisions reflect sheer guesswork. 
The accuracy of these contrasting visions depends in part on the nature of 
the policy issue, in part on the specific decisionmaker in question, and in part 
on additional issues beyond the scope of this Article. The important point is 
that a judicial strategy that focuses on manipulating legislative enactment costs 
is most likely to be effective when the legislature plausibly has better 
information about the connection between policy and outcomes than does the 
court. If the legislature’s information is not likely to be much better than the 
court’s, then the court may be better off doing the constitutional balancing 
directly (either retail or wholesale). 
 
36.  See,  e.g., Cox, supra note 19, at 209-10; Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members 
of Congress, 63 N.C.  L.  REV.  707, 722-25 (1985); Adrian Vermeule, Common Law 
Constitutionalism and the Limits of Reason, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1482, 1507-11 (2007). 
37.  See Devins, supra note 19, at 1182-86. STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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Of course, even if the legislature initially has better information than the 
court, the court may not need to use something like the enactment cost 
strategy. Perhaps the court can learn what the legislature knows through more 
direct means, such as demanding disclosure of relevant evidence.
38 The 
problem with this strategy is that the courts may lack the necessary time or 
expertise to assess the evidence proffered by the government. Furthermore, if 
the legislature’s decision is informed in the sense that it is responsive to the 
information of a diverse array of constituents and interest groups, there may be 
nothing tangible to disclose. Courts might also do their own research or rely on 
information from third parties, but again the institutional limitations of courts 
may preclude complete elimination of the informational asymmetry. The 
court’s ability to reduce its informational disadvantage is likely to vary across 
different situations. The greater the court’s ability to acquire relevant 
information directly, the less necessary or desirable the manipulation of 
legislative enactment costs will be as a means of extracting credible 
information. Such a strategy is most useful in cases in which the judiciary finds 
it impossible or excessively costly to acquire credible information from the 
legislature through more direct means. 
Despite the judiciary’s disadvantages with respect to information about the 
connection between policies and outcomes, the court must have reasonably 
accurate information about legislative preferences in order for manipulation of 
enactment costs to be a viable strategy.
39 The court’s information need not be 
perfect, but the more uncertain the court is about legislative preferences, the 
greater the error costs that doctrinal manipulation of enactment costs will 
entail. To make this abstract point more concrete, consider again the 
hypothetical Internet regulation statute. In order for an enactment cost strategy 
to be viable, the court’s judgment as to whether the legislature typically 
overvalues national security or copyright protection relative to constitutional 
liberty must be better than the court’s judgment of the statute’s actual impact 
on the national security or intellectual property interests at stake. 
This assumption will clearly not hold in all cases, but there are reasons to 
suppose it will often be plausible. First, because political or ideological 
considerations are likely to affect a large number of decisions, the court may 
have a larger number of data points from which to infer legislative preferences. 
Second, courts may be able to draw inferences about legislative preferences by 
 
38.  See Stephenson, supra note 28. 
39.  For similar reasons, the court also must have some sense of how different doctrinal 
requirements will affect legislative and social opportunity costs. Without such information, 
the court will not be able to determine what additional enactment cost, if any, would 
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observing structural features of the political system. For example, it may be 
reasonable to assume that legislative preferences will typically be biased in 
favor of politically powerful groups such as those with highly concentrated 
interests,
40 or in the direction of addressing highly visible or salient public 
concerns.
41 Electoral pressures may also distort legislative efforts in the 
direction of short-term results or easily observable benefits.
42 
 
3. The Social Costs of Enactment Costs 
The third critical assumption is that t h e  c o u r t  m u s t  b e  a b l e  t o  f a s h i o n  
doctrines that increase the private opportunity costs to policymakers more than 
the attendant social opportunity costs. As the earlier discussion noted, if 
legislators devote more time and energy to passing one piece of legislation, 
they have less time to devote to other tasks, such as work on other legislation, 
oversight activities, campaigning, constituency service, and leisure.
43 Diversion 
of resources away from these activities is personally costly to legislators, which 
is why enactment costs can function as a screening device. But this resource 
diversion may be socially costly if the other activities that compete for 
legislative time and attention also serve the public interest. Thus, the valuable 
screening function that enactment costs may perform is not free. Although 
raising the legislature’s enactment costs improves screening—making it less 
likely that the legislature will enact a statute that would fail an ideal balancing 
test—it also means that any statutes that are enacted will entail a higher social 
cost than they would have otherwise.
44 
Raising the legislature’s enactment costs is only a desirable strategy if the 
additional private opportunity costs for the enacting coalition are sufficiently 
high relative to the additional social opportunity costs. Otherwise, the expected 
benefits of improved screening will be offset by the expected social costs of 
making legislative action more difficult. Furthermore, as long as at least some 
 
40.  See,  e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971); MANCUR OLSON, THE 
RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS (1982). 
41.  See Hugo Hopenhayn & Susanne Lohmann, Fire-Alarm Signals and the Political Oversight of 
Regulatory Agencies, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 196 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 1119 (2002) (book review). 
42.  See Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Politics and the Suboptimal Provision of Counterterror, 61 INT’L 
ORG. 9 (2007); Susanne Lohmann, An Information Rationale for the Power of Special Interests, 
92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 809 (1998). 
43.  See  supra  text accompanying note 22. 
44.  Of course, the social cost may be offset if the costly activities the court demands have 
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of the legislature’s private enactment costs represent social opportunity costs, 
the court will not want to increase enactment costs to the point at which the 
legislature would never pass a statute with negative social value. Instead, the 
court will tolerate some degree of incentive misalignment to avoid excessive 
expenditure of scarce legislative resources on any one statute. 
All this indicates that an enactment cost strategy is less desirable when the 
other activities competing for legislators’ attention are more socially valuable. If 
one believes that more work on securing passage of the hypothetical Internet 
regulation bill would come primarily at the expense of retail constituency 
service work or leisure time for legislative staff, then raising the enactment 
costs of the Internet bill may entail relatively low social opportunity costs. On 
the other hand, if devoting more effort to passing the Internet bill would divert 
resources from overseeing the implementation of existing statutes or securing 
passage of other valuable legislation, then raising enactment costs may impose 
significant social costs.
45 A  j u d i c i a l  s t r a t e g y  t h a t  i n v o l v e s  s o m e  i n c r e a s e  i n  
enactment costs may still result in better expected outcomes than the court 
would achieve if it attempted to balance constitutional values against 
government interests directly, but the difference in relative desirability would 
be smaller. 
There may appear to be some tension between the assumption that the 
legislature is positively responsive to legitimate public interests and the 
assumption that the social opportunity costs of legislative enactment efforts are 
relatively small. The former assumption seems to rest on an optimistic view of 
the legislative process, while the latter assumption appears to rest on a more 
pessimistic view that legislators devote much of their time and energy to 
activities with low social utility. The tension dissolves, however, if one makes 
the plausible assumption that although the legislative interest in any specific 
project is positively correlated (in expectation) with the social value of that 
project, the legislator’s prioritization of various activities does not correspond 
to a socially optimal prioritization. This is analogous to stating that a firm 
manager’s incentive to pursue a project is positively correlated with the 
profitability of that project for the firm, but also that the manager’s allocation 
of effort across projects diverges from the allocation that would maximize the 
firm’s profitability. 
 
 
45.  Cf. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita & Matthew C. Stephenson, Regulatory Quality Under Imperfect 
Oversight, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 605 (2007) (differentiating situations in which greater 
effort devoted to a given policy is socially costly from situations in which it is not). STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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4. Implementability 
The fourth critical assumption of the enactment cost theory is that courts 
are able to devise and implement doctrines that raise legislative enactment costs 
in meaningful and predictable ways. In general, courts cannot mandate 
additional enactment costs directly—they cannot, for example, impose a direct 
tax on legislators for allocating resources to particular bills. Instead, the main 
weapon available to the court is its power to strike down a law or policy. By 
conditioning judicial approval of a challenged law on whether the legislature 
has engaged in some set of costly activities, a reviewing court can raise 
legislative enactment costs. For this approach to work, however, two 
conditions must hold. 
First, legislators must care about whether the statute is upheld by the court. 
There may be cases in which this condition fails. Legislators sometimes vote 
for statutes without knowing or caring whether those statutes will survive 
constitutional scrutiny; the symbolic political benefit of taking a position on 
some salient public issue may be all that matters.
46 Furthermore, legislators 
may sometimes vote for a statute knowing, or even hoping, that the court will 
reject or limit it. That way, the legislators can take credit for a popular but ill-
advised statute without having to deal with the undesirable consequences of 
actually passing that statute into law.
47 
These caveats notwithstanding, it seems implausible to suppose that 
legislators are systematically indifferent to the fate of the statutes they pass. 
After all, excessive indifference to legal viability can be a risky political strategy. 
Sophisticated interest groups may well be aware of the doctrinal prerequisites 
for constitutional validity. They will not be satisfied by empty symbolism, and 
they will lobby for enactment of policies that will actually go into effect. 
Furthermore, the unsophisticated mass public may only care whether, at the 
end of the day, the problem the statute was meant to address was solved. 
Average voters may be difficult to appease through symbolic position-taking 
 
46.  See DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 61-73 (1974). 
47.  See Eli M. Salzberger, A Positive Analysis of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, or: Why Do 
We Have an Independent Judiciary?, 13 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 349, 361-64 (1993). A related 
argument is that legislators often prefer that the courts resolve controversial issues so that 
the legislators do not have to address these issues. See Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian 
Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993); Keith E. 
Whittington,  “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial 
Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583 (2005). STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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precisely because they are unsophisticated and uninformed.
48 Having a statute 
struck down as unconstitutional may also reflect badly on the legislature, and it 
may embolden those legislators or constituencies that opposed the legislation 
in the first place. Finally, to the extent that legislators care about advancing a 
policy agenda, they will have an interest in enacting statutes that actually 
become law. Thus it is reasonable to suppose that there is a sizeable set of cases 
for which conditioning judicial approval on legislative enactment costs is likely 
to have an effect on actual government behavior. 
The second condition is that the court must be able to establish, within the 
constraints of existing institutional arrangements, doctrines that actually raise 
the government’s enactment costs. That is, the reviewing court must be able to 
impose conditions that the legislature must meet in order for a statute in a 
given class to be upheld, and these conditions must be credible, meaningful, 
foreseeable, and consistent with other features of American judicial and 
legislative institutions. This last condition is important here because the point 
of this Article is not to consider what sort of institutional arrangements might 
be possible if one were building a political-judicial system from scratch, but 
whether the existing federal judiciary has available doctrinal resources that are, 
or can be, used to better achieve an appropriate constitutional balance by 
raising legislative enactment costs. This issue is sufficiently important that I 
treat it separately in Part II. 
ii. the practice of enactment cost manipulation 
Part I argued that when four key assumptions hold, courts can improve the 
constitutional performance of government policymaking institutions by 
conditioning judicial approval of certain constitutionally problematic policies 
on the government’s willingness to undertake activities that raise the costs of 
enacting those policies. Doing so screens out government actions with benefits 
that are low relative to their constitutional and other social costs, while 
allowing the government to take action with relatively high social benefits. 
That, at least, is the theory. Does anything like this occur in practice? After 
all, courts typically do not speak in these terms, nor do most constitutional 
scholars. One of the challenges and intended contributions of this Article is to 
show that something like the enactment cost strategy is in fact much more 
 
48.  See Matthew C. Stephenson, Court of Public Opinion: Government Accountability and Judicial 
Independence, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 379, 393-94 (2004); Matthew C. Stephenson, “When the 
Devil Turns . . . ”: The Political Foundations of Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 
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widespread in constitutional law than is generally acknowledged. As I will try 
to establish, the prevailing doctrinal approaches in many areas of constitutional 
law condition judicial approval on the willingness of legislators, or other 
government decisionmakers, to incur some substantial cost, over and above the 
“ordinary” cost of enacting a given policy. In some cases, it may be that these 
doctrines emerge, persist, and evolve largely because of their effect on 
enactment costs, even if they are not typically explained or defended in those 
terms. Furthermore, even if the effect of these doctrines on legislative 
enactment costs is entirely unintentional, the enactment cost theory might 
provide a normative justification for at least some of these doctrinal strategies, 
independent of their conventionally recognized effects. Focusing on the 
enactment cost justification for various doctrines may, in turn, suggest ways in 
which these doctrines ought to be refined or reformed. 
This Part discusses four mechanisms through which constitutional doctrine 
might raise legislative enactment costs. First, constitutional doctrine might 
demand a direct government expenditure of material resources in order to 
eliminate a constitutional deficiency. Second, constitutional doctrine might 
impose onerous statutory drafting conditions, such as narrow tailoring or clear 
statement requirements. Third, constitutional doctrine might reward or 
penalize various forms of legislative history, making judicial approval easier 
when the desirable forms of legislative history are present and the undesirable 
forms are absent. Fourth, courts might devise constitutional doctrines that are 
unpredictable in their application, which from an ex ante perspective may have 
the same effect as an increase in enactment costs. 
A. Expenditure of Material Resources 
The natural place to begin is with those doctrines that expressly demand 
that the government expend material resources to eliminate or remedy a 
constitutional defect. Most obviously, some constitutional rules require the 
government to pay money to injured parties. Similarly, judicial doctrines that 
impose additional procedural requirements—either directly under the Due 
Process Clause or indirectly through doctrines that reward procedural 
formality with greater judicial deference—may require greater outlays from the 
public treasury. These effects will raise legislative enactment costs to the extent 
that the decisive coalition internalizes some of the costs associated with greater 
expenditures of public funds. 
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 1. Constitutional Liability Rules 
Some constitutional rules raise the material resource cost to government of 
constitutionally problematic activities by requiring the government to pay 
compensation to injured parties. Of these, the most well known is the 
requirement that the government pay “just compensation” when it takes 
property for public use pursuant to the eminent domain power.
49 There are 
arguably other constitutional liability rules as well, and some scholars have 
argued for broader use of liability rules, as opposed to “constitutional property 
rules,” in other domains of constitutional law.
50 Constitutional liability rules, 
like other liability rules, are often defended as serving both an interest in 
compensation and an interest in deterrence.
51 In addition, constitutional 
liability rules, particularly the Just Compensation Clause, are sometimes 
defended on fairness grounds that go beyond the traditional interest in 
compensation. According to this argument, fairness requires that benefits to 
the general public be paid for by the general public rather than by a small 
number of disproportionately affected property owners.
52 
The compensation and fairness rationales for constitutional liability rules 
have no direct relationship to the enactment cost theory elaborated in Part I, 
but the deterrence rationale is a straightforward application of that theory. The 
familiar argument runs as follows: If the government does not have to pay 
compensation when it seizes private property, it will take property even when 
the benefit of the taking, as perceived by the government, is less than the 
benefit to the existing owners of retaining their property (as reflected in market 
prices). If, however, the government must pay just compensation, the 
 
49.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
50.  See Eugene Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass Detentions, 
56 STAN. L. REV. 755 (2004) [hereinafter Kontorovich, Liability Rules]; Thomas W. Merrill, 
The Constitution and the Cathedral: Prohibiting, Purchasing, and Possibly Condemning Tobacco 
Advertising, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1143, 1157-65 (1999); cf. Eugene Kontorovich, The Constitution 
in Two Dimensions: A Transaction Cost Analysis of Constitutional Remedies, 91 VA. L. REV. 1135 
(2005) (arguing that constitutional liability rules are already more prevalent than is 
generally appreciated). 
51.   On the deterrence rationale, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 84-85 
(1993); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 58-59 (7th ed. 2007); and William 
A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on Economic 
Interpretations of “Just Compensation” Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 269-70 (1988). On the 
compensation rationale, see Kontorovich, Liability Rules, supra note 50, at 759-60, 774. 
52.  See,  e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (stating that the purpose of the 
Takings Clause is to prevent the government “from forcing some people alone to bear public 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole”). STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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government will take the property if and only if the monetized benefit of the 
taking to the government is greater than the market price. Thus, the 
compensation requirement allows socially efficient takings, in which the 
monetized public benefit exceeds the market price, but deters socially 
inefficient takings, in which the monetized public benefit is below the market 
price.
53 
An important feature of the deterrence argument—and an important way 
in which it differs from the compensation and fairness rationales—is that the 
court could achieve the optimal behavioral result through injunctive relief if the 
court had accurate information about the social benefit of the proposed public 
use. If the court had such information, it could simply prohibit takings with 
negative net benefits and allow takings with positive net benefits, without 
requiring that any compensation be paid in the latter case. Likewise, the 
deterrence argument implicitly assumes that the government does not 
internalize the full social costs of the taking to the property owner (or, 
equivalently, that the government overvalues the benefits of the taking). If this 
were not so, then the government would take the property if and only if the 
true social benefit were greater than the true social cost, without any need for 
judicial intervention. 
The deterrence rationale for a just compensation rule is therefore sensible 
only if we assume that the government is better informed than the court as to 
the consequences of the taking but gives insufficient relative weight to the 
interests of the property owners. Under these circumstances, a government left 
to its own devices would take property too often, while a court attempting to 
police takings through absolute injunctions would make frequent errors that 
allow too many, or too few, takings to occur. A compensation requirement, 
though imperfect, may induce better overall results because the increase in 
enactment costs may offset the government’s excessive zeal for takings. 
The fact that the enactment cost in this context takes the form of a transfer 
from the government to the injured party makes the strategy more attractive. 
Conceivably, we could achieve the same deterrence result simply by making the 
 
53.   An obvious but important objection is the Coasean argument that an absolute property 
rule—either that the government may take without compensation, or that the government 
may not take without the permission of the property owner—would achieve the same result 
when transaction costs are zero, because open-market bargaining will always cause the 
property to be assigned to the party that places a higher value on it. See Guido Calabresi & 
A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & 
ECON. 1 (1960). The literature on this argument is too vast to summarize here. I assume, for 
purposes of developing the argument, that there are many situations where transaction costs 
or market failures preclude efficient Coasean bargaining. STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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government destroy an amount of public money equal to the market value of 
the seized property, but that approach would involve a pure deadweight social 
loss.
54 The transfer payment to the property owner does not eliminate the 
social cost of the taking because the compensation payment will require 
additional tax revenue, borrowing, or the diversion of resources from other 
government programs, but the deadweight loss component of the enactment 
cost will be proportionally smaller.
55 
A general problem with viewing this sort of monetary liability rule as an 
effective enactment cost strategy is that it assumes the government internalizes 
the costs associated with expenditures from the public treasury. Several 
scholars have observed, however, that governments do not act like profit-
maximizing firms.
56 Neither elected politicians nor bureaucrats are directly 
rewarded for how effectively they manage public revenues, especially when the 
government’s capacity to run large budget deficits permits the legislature to 
operate under a relatively soft budget constraint.
57 Furthermore, the amounts 
of money involved in compensating property owners are small relative to the 
government’s overall budget, and the burdens of supplying the needed funds 
c a n  b e  c o n c e n t r a t e d  o n  p o l i t i c a l l y  w e a k  g r o u p s  e i t h e r  b y  r a i s i n g  t h e i r  t a x  
burden or by diverting funds from programs that would otherwise benefit 
those groups.
58 
These objections, while important, should not be overstated. While the 
federal government, as well as the governments of some states and large cities, 
may not be all that concerned about the amounts of public money that 
contemplated takings would require, many local governments are more 
financially constrained.
59 Moreover, unlike the federal government, many 
states and localities are subject to balanced-budget requirements that give 
sitting legislatures and executives less freedom to shift costs to future years 
 
54.   This is a characteristic feature, and a recognized weakness, of this form of “money burning” 
signaling argument. See Stephenson, Costly Signaling, supra note 3, at 785-87. 
55.   Of course, it might be even more socially efficient if the government were compelled to pay 
the market value of the property not to the former owners, but rather to starving children 
(or some other socially worthy cause). 
56.  See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of 
Constitutional Costs, 67 U.  CHI.  L.  REV.  345, 345-48, 354-57 (2000); Louis Kaplow, An 
Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 567-70 (1986); Edward Rubin, 
Commentary, Rational States?, 83 VA. L. REV. 1433, 1439-42 (1991). 
57.  See Levinson, supra note 56, at 354-57. 
58.  See  id. at 375-77. 
59.  See Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments and the 
Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624 (2006). STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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(though state and local governments have found ways to circumvent some of 
these limits).
60 And while government officials are not profit maximizers, they 
may well want to maximize some combination of political support and the 
achievement of specific policy objectives—and government money can be used 
to buy both of those things.
61 A rational politician faced with the need to use 
some government money to compensate for a taking of property would try to 
raise this money in whatever manner is least disruptive of her political and 
policy goals, but the fact that she will rationally try to minimize the 
opportunity costs associated with a taking of property does not mean that 
those opportunity costs are zero. 
Thus, the claim that monetary liability cannot function as an effective 
deterrent to inefficient takings—or, in the language I employ here, that 
monetary liability is not a meaningful enactment cost—seems overstated. That 
said, the amount of money that a legislature would need to pay to achieve “just 
compensation” often may not result in significant increases in legislative 
enactment costs because the legislature does not internalize the full social cost 
of the compensation payment, just as the legislature does not internalize the 
full social cost of the taking itself. Perhaps larger monetary liability would 
achieve the desired deterrence result, which raises the intriguing (though 
perhaps unrealistic) possibility that the government should be required to pay 
the former owner compensation well in excess of the property’s market value.
62 
The fact that compensatory monetary liability may not achieve optimal 
deterrence further suggests the need to look at other ways that courts might 
raise the enactment costs of constitutionally problematic policy decisions, 
particularly those that involve costs that are more fully internalized by the 
enacting coalition. 
 
 
60.  See D. Roderick Kiewiet & Kristin Szakaly, Constitutional Limitations on Borrowing: An 
Analysis of State Bonded Indebtedness, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 62 (1996). 
61.  See BUENO DE MESQUITA ET AL., supra note 22, at 8, 29-31, 58-59; JOHN A. FEREJOHN, PORK 
BARREL  POLITICS 49-51 (1974); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure 
Groups for Political Influence, 48 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983); Arthur T. Denzau & Michael C. 
Munger, Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented, 80 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 89 (1986); Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Protection for Sale, 84 
AM. ECON. REV. 833 (1994); see also Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: 
The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845 (2001) (responding to 
Daryl Levinson’s critique of the deterrence rationale for making the government pay 
compensation). 
62.   The downside of this, however, is that the social cost of a larger transfer is likely to be 
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2. Procedural Safeguards 
Requiring a direct payment to injured parties is not the only way that 
courts can raise the material cost of constitutionally problematic government 
enactments. Other doctrinal rules and principles may also raise the resource 
costs of certain policy decisions. For example, courts might invoke the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment to require the 
government to provide (costly) procedural safeguards before the government 
may interfere with certain constitutionally significant interests. Supreme Court 
case law on procedural due process has elaborated the sorts of procedural 
protections that are required for different forms of deprivation of liberty or 
property.
63 Other constitutional provisions provide for more specific 
procedural protections for particular types of government action, such as the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and the Fifth Amendment’s grand 
jury indictment requirement. 
In addition to those constitutional rules that directly require some type of 
procedural formality, other constitutional doctrines indirectly encourage—or, 
in some cases, practically require—the government to use elaborate procedures 
in order to secure judicial approval for an otherwise constitutionally doubtful 
decision. In the takings context, for instance, the Fifth Amendment requires 
the government to establish that the taking is for a “public use.” This 
requirement is particularly salient when the government transfers property 
between private parties.
64 Whether the government used elaborate formal 
procedures in making the decision to take the property would not seem to bear 
any necessary relationship to the question of whether the taking serves a public 
use, yet Public Use Clause opinions sometimes emphasize this consideration.
65 
Similarly, in the nonconstitutional administrative law context, whether an 
agency used formal decision-making procedures in promulgating an 
 
63.  See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 
532 (1985); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); 
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
64.  See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 
U.S. 986 (1984); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 
U.S. 26 (1954). 
65.  See, e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484 (emphasizing the “comprehensive character of the [city’s 
development] plan” and the “thorough deliberation that preceded its adoption”); id. at 493 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting the city’s compliance “with elaborate procedural 
requirements” as a reason not to apply a stricter standard of review to the city’s taking and 
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interpretation of a statute is a central factor courts consider in deciding whether 
the agency’s interpretation is entitled to deference.
66 
The conventional justification for constitutionally or judicially imposed 
procedural requirements is that they increase accuracy by correcting mistakes 
ex post and by encouraging government decisionmakers to be more thoughtful 
and careful ex ante.  I do not dispute this benefit of procedural formality, 
though there is room for disagreement about how effective the sorts of 
procedures mandated by courts actually are in improving substantive accuracy. 
I want to suggest that in addition to whatever direct accuracy-improving or 
error-correction effects formal procedures may have, additional procedures also 
raise the material costs of certain government actions, whether that action is 
conducting a search, taking private property, terminating welfare benefits, or 
what have you. If the relevant government decisionmaker internalizes a 
significant portion of these resource costs, then judicial imposition of formal 
procedural requirements will increase enactment costs, with the potential 
screening results described in Part I.
67 
This separate effect is easier to see if we assume,  counterfactually, that 
procedural formality has no direct effect on accuracy. If we make that 
assumption, then the only function that these procedures have (aside from 
whatever psychological or legitimacy benefits they may confer) is to increase 
the material cost to the government of taking the action that requires the use of 
procedures. This procedural cost may function as an enactment cost, deterring 
the government from taking action when the perceived net benefit to the 
government of the action is low, but enabling the government to take action 
when the perceived net benefit of the action to the government is high. 
Again, my argument is not that this is the only effect of procedural 
formality. If it were, then some other costly activity, including burning money 
or buying food for starving children, would be just as effective at protecting 
constitutional values as requiring formal procedures (except insofar as 
procedural formality has some intrinsic constitutional value). The argument is 
that in addition to whatever benefits formal procedures have with respect to 
improving accuracy, they may also have the screening benefits associated with 
increasing enactment costs. The strength of this latter benefit is proportional to 
the degree to which the relevant government decisionmaker internalizes the 
costs associated with the additional formal procedures. 
 
66.  See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-31 (2001); see also Stephenson, Strategic 
Substitution, supra note 3, at 534 n.14 (advancing a rationalist explanation for why procedural 
formality affects judicial deference to agency legal interpretations). 
67.  See Masur, supra note 3; Stephenson, Strategic Substitution, supra note 3. STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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This perspective on procedural requirements has at least two interesting 
implications. First, it implies that the marginal benefit of any given procedural 
safeguard may be higher than it would appear if only error-correction benefits 
were considered. To put the point in a slightly different way, the enactment 
cost perspective suggests that the marginal cost of additional procedures may 
be less than it might otherwise appear: While some of the additional 
procedural cost is indeed a social cost, some of that cost has a partially 
offsetting social benefit insofar as it more closely aligns government 
preferences with social preferences. Second, because of the screening effect, the 
set of cases that are actually subjected to the required formal procedures is 
likely to consist disproportionately of cases in which the government interest in 
taking the action is relatively strong. These observations together suggest that 
one might underestimate the net benefits of judicially imposed procedures if 
one neglects the enactment cost effect and looks only at cases in which the 
government decided to take the action that triggers the additional procedural 
safeguards. 
That said, the concerns about the efficacy of direct monetary compensation 
apply to the use of costly procedures as well. If the responsible government 
decisionmakers do not internalize a substantial portion of the procedural costs, 
or if the procedural costs themselves are insignificant relative to the other costs 
and benefits at stake, then the effect of judicially imposed procedural formality 
on enactment costs may be trivial. This suggests that the marginal benefits of 
such procedural requirements are likely to be higher when they require the 
primary government decisionmaker to internalize significant costs than when 
they do not. It also suggests the importance of looking beyond material 
resource expenditures to other types of judicially imposed requirements that 
more directly raise enactment costs by imposing burdens directly on the 
government actors involved in promulgating constitutionally problematic 
policy decisions. 
B. Statutory Drafting 
Another way that courts can raise the enactment costs of constitutionally 
questionable policies is to impose drafting requirements that make 
promulgation of such policies more time-consuming and difficult. I will focus 
on two closely related drafting requirements that may have this effect. The first 
is the requirement that a statute be narrowly tailored to achieve some 
legitimate purpose. The second is the requirement that, in order to achieve 
certain constitutionally problematic results, the legislature must provide a clear 
statement of its intent. Narrow tailoring requirements and clear statement STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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rules have many effects, but one effect common to both is an increase in the 
costs associated with drafting a statute to achieve a disfavored result. 
 
1. Narrow Tailoring 
Numerous constitutional doctrines, most notably in the areas of free 
speech, due process, and equal protection, demand that statutes be “narrowly 
tailored.”
68 The obvious and intuitive purpose of a narrow tailoring 
requirement is to reduce the problem of overinclusiveness, along with the 
attendant risk that an overbroad statute will be applied in an undesirable 
discriminatory fashion.
69 Put another way, a narrow tailoring requirement may 
be a way to ensure that statutory restrictions are only applied in those cases in 
which the social benefits of these restrictions are high relative to the 
constitutional costs. Even if the aggregate benefits of a broadly worded statute 
would outweigh the aggregate costs, a court might still want to improve the 
cost-benefit ratio by eliminating, to the extent possible, those individual 
applications for which the costs exceed the benefits. 
This does not completely explain why a court would strike down an entire 
statute on the grounds that it failed the narrow tailoring requirement. Even if 
the courts dispensed with the narrow tailoring requirement, they could accept 
case-by-case challenges to particular applications of the statute. This alternative 
approach has several drawbacks, however. Reliance on as-applied challenges 
may create substantial uncertainty for both regulators and potentially regulated 
parties, and it may also entail significant litigation costs for litigants and courts. 
It may therefore be more sensible for the court to insist that the legislature do 
the narrowing of the statute ex ante, rather than relying on the judiciary to 
address the overinclusiveness problem ex post. Doing so may lessen the 
 
68.  See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774-75 (2002); Reno v. ACLU, 521 
U.S. 844, 846 (1997); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); Ward 
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 
(1982); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 215-17 (1975); Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 
150-51 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551-52 (1965); Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 
UCLA L. REV. 1781 (1996); Coenen, supra note 2, at 1823-28; Fallon, supra note 34. 
69.  See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992); Ayres, supra note 68, 
at 1786; Coenen, supra note 2, at 1728; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible 
Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417 (1996). STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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aggregate social costs of reducing statutory overinclusiveness, and it will also 
shift those costs from courts and litigants to the enacting legislature.
70 
This last point about shifting the costs of tailoring the statute to the 
legislature suggests that a narrow tailoring requirement may also be a way for 
courts to raise legislative enactment costs, independent of the effect of the 
narrow tailoring requirement on how broadly the statute will actually apply. 
We can see this by considering a hypothetical case in which the narrow 
tailoring requirement has no effect on the scope of a statute’s application in 
practice. Suppose that the legislature is considering a statute that prohibits 
publication of “information which would tend to undermine national security.” 
On its face, the statute appears to sweep very broadly. Suppose, however, that 
we make the (unrealistic) assumption that in practice law enforcement officials 
would only apply the statute to some subset of the conduct that might 
conceivably violate the statute’s broad terms. Call this subset X. Alternatively, 
we might define X as the subset of applications that the court, applying the 
relevant doctrinal tests for as-applied constitutional challenges, would permit. 
Although the broadly worded statute appears to prohibit a large set of 
activities, its actual effect is to prohibit only conduct in subset X. 
Now imagine that the Supreme Court imposes a narrow tailoring 
requirement that says the statute is unconstitutional unless the statutory 
language itself restricts application to subset X. By assumption, compliance 
with this narrow tailoring requirement would not narrow the actual application 
of the statute, because the conduct that the statute prohibits in practice is only 
subset  X, with or without narrow tailoring of the statute itself. But the 
enactment cost to the legislature is higher under the narrow tailoring 
requirement, because the legislature has to try to determine the subset X ahead 
of time, draft sufficiently detailed statutory language to define that set, and 
bear whatever opportunity and political costs are associated with engaging in 
that additional drafting activity. 
The analysis in Part I suggests a reason why the court might want to 
impose a narrow tailoring requirement in such a case, even though the scope of 
the statute’s practical application would not be affected. The court might worry 
that, although prohibiting conduct in subset X might be justified by a 
sufficiently compelling interest, the legislature undervalues the constitutional 
concerns at stake relative to the competing government interests. But, the court 
might be aware that the legislature has better information about the actual 
 
70.  Cf. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) 
(discussing the salient differences between resolving questions about a law’s application ex 
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effect of prohibiting the conduct in subset X. Even though the narrow tailoring 
requirement does not alter the scope of the statute’s application in practice, it 
means the legislature will not bother enacting a narrowly tailored statute unless 
the benefits are sufficiently large. If the assumptions developed in Part I hold, 
then this narrow tailoring approach may be a sensible strategy for the 
reviewing court.
71 
To be clear, my claim is not that narrow tailoring requirements do not alter 
the breadth of a statute’s application if it is enacted. The preceding example 
made that assumption in order to clarify a separate and independent effect that 
a narrow tailoring requirement may have on legislative enactment costs. Seeing 
narrow tailoring doctrines in this light reveals their importance not only in 
cabining the scope of constitutionally problematic enactments, but also in 
ensuring that such statutes are justified by sufficiently weighty government 
interests. This suggests an additional reason why a court might prefer to 
impose a narrow tailoring requirement, rather than limiting statutory 
overinclusiveness through ex post judicial limitations on the scope of the 
statute’s permissible applications. 
 
2. Interpretive Presumptions and Clear Statement Rules 
In addition to narrow tailoring mandates, courts can impose other 
requirements on the statutory drafting process that raise the enactment costs of 
constitutionally problematic policies. One common doctrinal technique with 
this effect is the so-called clear statement rule.
72 When a court invokes a clear 
statement rule, it announces that it will not ascribe to statutory language a 
certain disfavored meaning unless the legislature has made that meaning 
 
71.   This argument is similar to, but distinct from, the claim that narrow tailoring requirements 
ensure “some measure of care and deliberation in the lawmaking process itself.” Coenen, 
supra note 2, at 1728; see also Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 611-12 (suggesting this justification for the 
narrow tailoring requirement in the First Amendment context). The argument developed in 
this Article is not that narrow tailoring rules produce more careful and appropriate policy 
choices by forcing legislative reflection and deliberation, though that may well be one effect. 
Instead, the argument advanced here is that by raising the costs to legislators, narrow 
tailoring rules may implement a screening mechanism independent of any other effects on 
legislative reflection or consideration. 
72.   For general discussions of clear statement rules and related canons of statutory 
interpretation, see EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES (2008); Coenen, supra note 
2, at 1603-40; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear 
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND.  L.  REV.  593 (1992); and Cass R. 
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 451-60 (1989). STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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unmistakably clear in the text of the statute.
73 There are quite a few clear 
statement rules, many of which are explicitly designed to enforce constitutional 
values. Most obviously, under the modern version of the canon of 
constitutional avoidance, courts will construe statutes so that they do not raise 
difficult constitutional problems. That is, if Congress wishes to come close to 
the constitutional line, it must make its intention to do so clear.
74 There are 
also a variety of more specific clear statement rules that seem designed to 
protect constitutional values through statutory interpretation. These include 
the presumptions against federal derogation of traditional state functions
75 or 
abridgement of state sovereign immunity,
76 and the narrow construction given 
to conditions on federal grants,
77 which are all designed to protect federalism 
values; the rule of lenity
78 and the presumption in favor of judicial review,
79 
which protect due process values; the tendency to construe statutes in ways 
that favor groups that are especially vulnerable to government discrimination, 
 
73.   It is important to emphasize that when a court refuses to adopt a particular reading of a 
statute because Congress has not endorsed that reading with sufficient clarity, the court is 
rejecting the reading that its other tools of interpretation would otherwise indicate is the 
best understanding of the text. Otherwise, the clear statement rule has no effect on the 
outcome. 
74.  See,  e.g., Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); Zadvydas v. 
Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. 
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 
(1979); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in 
Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1028-34 (1989) (discussing the judicial use of 
clear statement rules to protect constitutional values); Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding 
Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003 (1994) (same). 
75.  See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 
(2005); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 
218, 230 (1947). 
76.  See Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533 (2002); Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. 
Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 204 (1991); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985); 
Employees of the Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare of Mo. v. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare 
of Mo., 411 U.S. 279 (1973). 
77.  See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). 
78.  See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit 
Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952). 
79.  See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996); Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 
U.S. 667 (1986); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The 
Presumption of Reviewability: A Study in Canonical Construction and Its Consequences, 45 VAND. 
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which advances the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause;
80 the 
presumptions against extraterritorial legislation
81 and against congressional 
derogation of the President’s foreign affairs power,
82 which safeguard 
presidential primacy in international relations; the presumption against 
retroactive deprivations of vested rights, which protects the property and 
liberty interests guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment as well as the interests 
safeguarded by the Contracts Clause;
83 and the judicial reluctance, at least in 
some instances, to read congressional delegations to executive branch agencies 
broadly, which may be a way of indirectly limiting congressional abdication of 
its Article I lawmaking responsibilities.
84 
Courts and sympathetic commentators typically justify the use of 
substantive, quasi-constitutional clear statement rules with one or more of four 
arguments. The first is the empirical claim that legislators are reluctant to 
intrude on the sensitive topics protected by the various clear statement rules. 
Thus, if the statute suggests but does not clearly require a meaning that would 
implicate the clear statement rule, it is probably the case that the members of 
the enacting legislative coalition did not intend or understand the statute to 
have that result. This is especially true if the provision at issue attracted little 
attention, debate, or opposition.
85 
The second argument in favor of clear statement rules is that they foster 
deliberation and careful consideration on constitutionally sensitive topics. 
Sophisticated legislators or interest groups will not be able to sneak something 
 
80.  See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 
461 U.S. 574 (1983); McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); 
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 72, at 602, 610-14; Sunstein, supra note 72, at 473, 484. 
81.  See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991). 
82.  See Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986); Dames & Moore v. 
Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
83.  See Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 358 (1999); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 
(1994); Winfree v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 227 U.S. 296, 301 (1913). 
84.  See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); Indus. Union Dep’t, 
AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980); John F. Manning, The Nondelegation 
Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223; Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation 
Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000). 
85.  See Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 139 (2005) (plurality opinion); 
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 
440, 466 (1989); Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 206 n.50 (1985); Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 
300 (1944); James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: 
Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 79 (1994); Eskridge, supra note 74, at 
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by a majority of the enacting coalition, nor will the legislature itself be able to 
sneak something by the voters. The demand for a clear statement, on this view, 
compels a greater level of transparency, deliberation, and accountability than 
would attend the ordinary legislative process.
86 
The third argument in favor of constitutionally derived clear statement 
rules appeals to a kind of judicial minimalism.
87 Because clear statement rules, 
particularly the canon of constitutional avoidance, obviate the need to resolve a 
hard constitutional question by deciding the case on statutory grounds, these 
rules are thought to foster judicial modesty and moderation, as well as to 
preserve the courts’ institutional legitimacy and authority and to limit conflict 
with the other branches of government.
88 
The fourth standard argument in favor of quasi-constitutional clear 
statement rules is more explicitly substantive, and perhaps for that reason it is 
less commonly articulated in judicial decisions. The argument goes something 
like this: The judiciary is charged with implementing duly enacted statutory 
law, but it is also charged with enforcing constitutional values. Courts have 
some authority to enforce constitutional values indirectly, by construing 
ambiguous statutes in ways that advance those values. This is not inconsistent 
with the judicial responsibility to enforce statutory law, because by definition 
an ambiguous statute is susceptible of multiple interpretations.
89 So, the 
argument goes, if the legislature has failed to provide sufficiently clear 
commands, the courts may and should interpret those ambiguous commands 
so as to advance other substantive values that are derived from the 
Constitution.
90 
 
86.  See Spector, 545 U.S. at 139; United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971); Greene v. 
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507 (1959); Calabresi, supra note 2, at 104; Eskridge & Frickey, supra 
note 72, at 631; Sunstein, supra note 72, at 471; Young, supra note 3, at 1608. 
87.  See  generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT (1999) (arguing in favor of minimalist approaches to judicial interpretation). 
88.  See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 
U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
89.  See Young, supra note 3, at 1588-93. 
90.  See Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: 
The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (1957); Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: 
The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 652 
n.308 (1995); Sunstein, supra note 72, at 459; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After 
Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2112 (1990); Young, supra note 3. This justification for 
using something like the constitutional avoidance canon to enforce constitutional values is 
more prominent in countries that lack a written constitution. See T.R.S. Allan, Legislative 
Supremacy and the Rule of Law: Democracy and Constitutionalism, 44  CAMBRIDGE  L.J. 111 
(1985) (England); Aharon Barak, The Supreme Court, 2001 Term—Foreword: A Judge on 
Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16 (2002) (Israel). STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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Critics of substantive clear statement rules have attacked all of these 
justifications on a variety of grounds.
91 This Article does not aspire to address 
or resolve these debates. Instead, it suggests that judicial demands for a clear 
congressional statement, in addition to whatever other effects they may have, 
can serve to increase legislative enactment costs for constitutionally 
problematic policies. This argument is similar to the last of the four 
justifications for constitutional clear statement rules sketched above. It differs, 
however, by emphasizing that the clear statement rule is a method for gauging 
indirectly the strength of the constitutional value relative to the other public 
interests at stake.
92 This argument thus avoids the potential criticism of the 
more standard constitutional values position that such an approach would lead 
to overprotection of certain constitutional values at the expense of other 
legitimate public interests. The point of the avoidance canon and related clear 
statement rules, on this account, is not simply to enforce a constitutional value, 
but to assess the relative strength of competing government interests. 
This argument parallels the earlier argument as to how narrow tailoring 
requirements can increase legislative enactment costs. Indeed, both narrow 
tailoring requirements and clear statement rules are, at bottom, judicial 
demands for greater precision in statutory drafting. Judicially devised clear 
statement rules and judicially imposed narrow tailoring requirements both 
require the enacting legislators and supportive interest groups to make a 
statute clearer if they want to achieve constitutionally problematic results. 
Producing this additional clarity raises the enactment costs for the coalition 
that supports the statute.
93 
 
91.  See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 800 (1983); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71. 
92.  Cf. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 262 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(“Clear-statement rules operate less to reveal actual congressional intent than to shield 
important values from an insufficiently strong legislative intent to displace them.”); Young, 
supra n o t e  3 ,  a t  1 5 5 2  ( c h a r a c t e r i z i n g  t h e  c o n s titutional avoidance canon as a “resistance 
norm” of constitutional law that “may be more or less yielding to governmental action, 
depending on the strength of the government's interest, the degree of institutional support 
for the challenged action, or the clarity of purpose that the legislature has expressed”). 
93.  See Brudney, supra note 85, at 30 (“[A]dding these details to text [to satisfy a judicial clear 
statement rule] increases the possibility for delay and obstruction even though the details 
themselves would command overwhelming support . . . . because each provision, clause, or 
word of a statute can become the focus of additional amendments or procedurally based 
attacks from a small but sufficiently determined minority.”); Rodriguez, supra note 79, at 
747 (“[T]he presumption of reviewability ensures that legislators must expend greater than 
normal costs to rebut this presumption . . . .”); Young, supra note 3, at 1597, 1608-09 (“The 
effect of the presumption [in favor of judicial review] is that supporters of administrative 
nonreviewability in Congress must expend the time, effort, and political capital necessary STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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As before, it is easier to see this effect if we assume that a clear statement 
rule neither reflects an accurate empirical judgment about legislators’ 
preferences nor improves the quality of legislative deliberation. To illustrate, 
let us again suppose that the legislature is considering the hypothetical Internet 
regulation statute. The enacting coalition and its supporters understand that 
the version of the statute originally proposed would authorize government 
monitoring of Internet activity in ways that would raise constitutional 
questions related to speech and privacy. The statute is sufficiently ambiguous, 
however, that a court could plausibly read the statute not to allow this sort of 
intrusive electronic snooping, even though that is not the best reading of the 
statutory text. 
Let us now consider three doctrinal regimes that the court might apply: one 
in which the court treats the electronic monitoring in question as 
constitutionally permissible, one in which the court treats it as prohibited, and 
one in which the court would hold that this sort of monitoring is permissible if 
the court were forced to address the question, but the court would avoid the 
constitutional question through statutory interpretation if possible. Let us also 
assume that the legislature can anticipate which approach the court will adopt. 
Under the first regime, the legislature would pass the original version of 
the statute and the court would uphold the electronic searches as 
constitutional. Under the second regime, the legislature would either amend 
the statute to remove the offending provision or allow the court to invalidate it. 
Under the third regime, in which the court applies a clear statement rule, the 
legislature’s choice is more complicated. The legislature could simply pass the 
statute as originally drafted, even though it knows that the court will adopt a 
strained interpretation that does not allow the problematic searches. 
Alternatively, the legislature could amend the statute to make explicit its 
authorization of electronic snooping. This latter approach would allow the 
intrusive electronic searches to go forward, but it would entail additional costs 
for the enacting coalition. 
There are a few reasons why compliance with a clear statement rule might 
entail significant additional enactment costs. First, even if legislators and 
interest groups are generally aware that reviewing courts will apply the 
constitutional avoidance canon or some other clear statement rule, these 
interested parties need to figure out exactly how to draft the statutory language 
to secure judicial approval. This takes work, and this work has opportunity 
costs: the legislative aide or interest group staffer who is working on crafting 
language that will satisfy the clear statement rule is not doing other things. 
 
squarely to confront the jurisdictional issue and formulate the needed clear statement of 
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Second, the need to get additional language into the bill provides one more 
opportunity for members of the enacting coalition to extract a price for their 
support and one more opportunity for opponents to obstruct or delay passage. 
Third, supporters of the constitutionally problematic provisions of the statute 
h a v e  o n l y  s o  m u c h  t i m e  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  c a p i t a l .  I f  t h e y  h a v e  t o  i n v e s t  t h e s e  
resources in fashioning a sufficiently clear statement to satisfy the courts, they 
may have less ability to advance other aspects of their agenda. This is especially 
so if the clarity of the statement itself raises the profile, and hence the political 
salience, of the constitutionally problematic provisions. 
If clearer statutory drafting is more expensive to members of the enacting 
legislative coalition and their supporters, then clear statement rules may raise 
enactment costs. Legislators and interest groups will be willing to bear these 
additional costs only if the statutory benefits internalized by the members of 
the enacting coalition are sufficiently high. If the four assumptions described in 
Part I hold, then the constitutional avoidance canon and other clear statement 
rules may help reviewing courts implement indirectly a regime that more 
closely approximates an ideal constitutional balancing test. Even if the 
interpretive canons applied by the court do not reflect an accurate empirical 
evaluation of legislative preferences, do not facilitate more deliberation, and do 
not appreciably reduce judicial activism, these canons may function as a 
screening device that helps to ensure that the legislature will not pursue 
constitutionally problematic policies unless the enacting coalition views those 
policies as sufficiently important. 
C. Legislative History 
Few issues in the theory and practice of statutory interpretation are as 
contentious as the debate over the proper role of legislative history. Any 
attempt to summarize this debate will oversimplify the more nuanced and 
sophisticated arguments for and against judicial use of legislative history in 
resolving statutory ambiguities.
94 With that caveat, most of the contemporary 
 
94.  For a small sampling of the vast literature on this topic, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., 
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994); Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without 
Legislative Intent: The Public Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1 (1999); Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. 
L.  REV. 845 (1992); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory 
Interpretation, 17 HARV.  J.L.  &  PUB.  POL’Y 61 (1994); John F. Manning, Textualism as a 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997); Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. 
Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417 (2003); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law 
Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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discussion revolves around three questions. The first is the degree to which 
different types of legislative history are reliable evidence of some normatively 
legitimate conception of statutory meaning.
95 The second question concerns 
the broader institutional effects that judicial use of legislative history may have 
on both the legislative process and the judicial process.
96 The third question is 
whether judicial use of legislative history may be illegitimate for reasons 
independent of its probative value or practical consequences.
97 
Again, these debates are sufficiently complex that this Article cannot and 
does not aspire to engage them directly, nor does it take a final position on 
when, if ever, courts should employ various forms of legislative history in 
statutory interpretation. I make the more modest claim that viewing 
constitutional doctrine through the lens of enactment cost manipulation 
suggests ways that courts might use legislative history in order to implement 
indirectly an appropriate constitutional balancing test. If judicial willingness to 
 
Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
(Amy Gutman ed., 1997); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of 
Separated Powers, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1457 (2000); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the 
Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371; Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the 
Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833 
(1998); and Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in 
Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 
277 (1990). 
95.  See Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 620 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment); James M. Landis, A Note on “Statutory Interpretation,” 43 HARV. L. REV. 886, 888 
(1930); McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory 
Interpretation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1994, at 3, 24. There is, in turn, an even 
more longstanding and complex debate over theories of statutory meaning. The three 
leading theories (really, categories of theories) are (1) intentionalism, which views the search 
for statutory meaning as a search for the intent of the enacting legislators; (2) purposivism, 
which seeks to identify a statutory purpose or set of purposes that may be different from or 
independent of the intention of any individual legislator; and (3) textualism, which posits 
that questions of statutory meaning turn on what the words of the statute would have been 
understood to mean by an objective reader of the statute familiar with the context in which 
it was enacted. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 94. Although criticism of the probative value of 
legislative history is often associated with textualism, while sympathy to the use of 
legislative history is usually associated with intentionalist or purposivist approaches, there is 
no necessary theoretical connection between these positions. It would be possible, for 
example, for a textualist to view legislative history as highly probative of how a reasonable 
person would have understood statutory language at the time it was enacted, while an 
intentionalist or purposivist might view certain forms of legislative history as highly 
unreliable guides to relevant forms of intention or purpose. 
96.  See Breyer, supra note 94, at 859; Elizabeth Garrett, Legal Scholarship in the Age of Legislation, 
34 TULSA L.J. 679, 685 (1999); W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need To Bring 
Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383, 407-10 (1992). 
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look to legislative materials beyond the text of the challenged enactment can 
raise the costs to the legislature of adopting constitutionally problematic 
policies, this can filter out government decisions that have low benefits relative 
to their constitutional costs. This argument differs from most of the 
conventional arguments for the use of legislative history in statutory 
interpretation, and it may therefore avoid some, though certainly not all, of the 
traditional criticisms. 
Judicial attention to legislative history can influence legislative enactment 
costs in at least two ways. First, certain types of legislative history may be 
costly to produce: extended hearings, elaborate studies, reports, and the like. If 
reviewing courts evince greater skepticism of enactments that are not 
accompanied by elaborate supplementary materials of this kind, the courts may 
effectively raise legislative enactment costs. Second, while potential members 
of an enacting coalition may view some forms of legislative history as costly, 
they may view other forms as politically beneficial. For instance, politicians 
might trumpet the harm that a given enactment will inflict on an unpopular 
minority group in order to appeal to the prejudices of a majority. If reviewing 
courts demonstrate a greater willingness to invalidate enactments accompanied 
by “bad” legislative history, they may effectively raise the costs of such 
enactments because supporters will not be able to advertise, and may even have 
to disclaim, objectives that would be politically popular. 
 
1.  Rewarding “Good” Legislative History: Analysis and Explanation 
Requirements 
When a reviewing court evaluates the legality of a government decision 
challenged on constitutional or other grounds, the court may consider whether 
the responsible government decisionmaker has developed an adequate 
explanation of the basis for its decision, often in the form of a record or report 
containing detailed evidence and analysis. The reviewing court may be more 
inclined to uphold a challenged action accompanied by such material, and in 
extreme cases the courts might treat development of a sufficiently detailed 
record as a prerequisite to the legal validity of the policy itself. 
These sorts of explanation requirements are the norm in judicial review of 
administrative agency decisions.
98 Although this approach is rarer and more 
 
98.  See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983); 
Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Stephen Breyer, 
Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 383 (1986); Sidney A. 
Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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controversial in judicial review of legislative decisionmaking, there are 
numerous examples of cases in which the Supreme Court appears to have 
conditioned its approval of a constitutionally problematic legislative enactment 
on the quality of the legislative record.
99 A particularly good illustration is the 
Court’s approach to assessing the constitutionality of prophylactic legislation 
enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 5 grants 
to Congress “the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation” the substantive 
provisions of the Amendment, including prohibitions on state deprivations of 
equal protection or due process.
100 The question of when Congress can invoke 
this power, particularly in the context of federal statutes that purport to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity from civil lawsuits, has proven difficult. 
The Supreme Court has held that the validity of a congressional invocation of 
Section 5 depends on the “congruence and proportionality” between the risk of 
constitutional violations and the legislative means adopted to prevent such 
violations.
101 Although the Court has repeatedly denied that the quality of the 
legislative record is a significant consideration in evaluating whether federal 
legislation satisfies the congruence and proportionality test,
102 in practice the 
 
the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 411-13, 419-25; 
Stephenson, Costly Signaling, supra note 3, at 758-61. 
99.  For scholarly discussions of this phenomenon, see A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. 
Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court’s New “On the Record” Constitutional 
Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328 (2001); William W. Buzbee & Robert A. 
Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REV. 87 (2001); Coenen, supra note 2, at 
1655-89; Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2001); 
Devins,  supra note 19; Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, 
Constitutional Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 695 (1996); 
Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the 
Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707 (2002); Harold J. Krent, 
Turning Congress into an Agency: The Propriety of Requiring Legislative Findings, 46 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 731 (1996); Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 226-
32 (1976); and Stephenson, Costly Signaling, supra note 3, at 794-800. 
100.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
101.  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). 
102.  See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 646 
(1999) (stating that “lack of support in the legislative record is not determinative” of 
whether Congress has exceeded its Section 5 powers); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531 (stating 
that “lack of support in the legislative record” is not dispositive and that judicial deference to 
congressional judgments is “based not on the state of the legislative record Congress 
compiles”); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971) (noting that Congress is not 
required to “make particularized findings in order to legislate”). STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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Court often points to the quantity and quality of evidence in the legislative 
record (or lack thereof) in making these determinations.
103 
Something like this approach also appears in some First Amendment 
speech cases, in which the Court has required Congress to present an adequate 
record showing the legitimacy of the purported government interest in 
imposing a speech restriction. In these cases, the question is typically whether 
the government’s interest in the challenged speech restriction is sufficiently 
weighty in light of the applicable level of scrutiny. In deciding that question, 
the Court often looks to the evidence in the legislative record compiled by 
Congress in support of the legislation.
104 As in the Section 5 cases, the Court 
disclaims any intent to treat Congress like an administrative agency by 
subjecting its record of decision to a kind of “hard look” review.
105 But, as in 
the Section 5 cases, the Court often seems to do precisely that. 
The focus on the quality of the legislative record shows up in equal 
protection jurisprudence as well, particularly in the affirmative action cases.
106 
Justice Powell, who wrote the controlling opinion in the seminal case Regents of 
the University of California v. Bakke,
107 appears to have viewed the adequacy of 
legislative findings as particularly important. Justice Powell emphasized that 
although a race-conscious admissions program at a public university might be 
constitutional in the presence of adequate findings that such a program was 
necessary to advance a compelling state interest in remedying past racial 
discrimination, the California Board of Regents had not made such findings 
with respect to the admissions policy challenged in Bakke.
108 Furthermore, in 
 
103.  See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 528-29 (2004); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 
538 U.S. 721, 730-32 (2003); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368-69, 
371 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88-89, 91 (2000); Fla. Prepaid, 527 
U.S. at 640, 644, 646. 
104.  See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 530-31 & n.17 (2001); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 
528 U.S. 377, 391-92 (2000); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 822 
(2000); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 196-213 (1997); Reno v. 
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 n.41, 879 (1997); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 
U.S. 622, 664-68 (1994); id. at 669 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., 
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128-30 (1989); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 
41, 60-62 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
105.  See, e.g., Turner I, 512 U.S. at 665-66. 
106.  See Coenen, supra note 2, at 1670-75. 
107.    438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
108.  Id. at 305 (“In this case .  .  . there has been no determination by the legislature or a 
responsible administrative agency that the University engaged in a discriminatory practice 
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his concurring opinion in Fullilove v. Klutznick,
109 which upheld an affirmative 
action program for federal public works projects, Justice Powell emphasized 
the importance of formal congressional findings and legislative history that 
established the program was necessary to remedy past discrimination.
110 More 
recent affirmative action decisions suggest that other members of the Court 
also view legislative findings as significant, though the opinions are somewhat 
opaque on this point.
111 
There are also examples of cases in which the Court might have adopted a 
doctrinal approach that emphasized the quality and comprehensiveness of the 
legislative record, but decided not to do so. The best illustrations are the 
Commerce Clause cases United States v. Lopez
112 and United States v. Morrison.
113 
The Fifth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Lopez indicated that adequate 
congressional findings were necessary to deciding that a federal law 
criminalizing possession of firearms near schools was a valid exercise of 
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.
114 The opinion suggested the 
possibility that adequate congressional findings might lead the court to find no 
constitutional violation.
115 In affirming the Fifth Circuit’s holding, the Supreme 
Court also emphasized the absence of congressional findings of a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce.
116 The Court, however, stressed that it would 
 
109.  448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
110.  Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 502-03 (Powell, J., concurring); see also id. at 549-50, 552 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that congressional findings were inadequate to justify the program). 
111.  See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 220-21 (1995); City of Richmond v. 
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492, 500, 504, 510 (1989); id. at 520 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986); Miss. Univ. for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 & n.16 (1982); Coenen, supra note 2, at 1673-75. 
112.   514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
113.   529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
114.  2 F.3d 1342, 1362-64 (5th Cir. 1993). As support for this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit cited 
several Supreme Court cases in which, according to the Fifth Circuit, statutes had been 
“upheld against Commerce Clause attacks on the basis of formal Congressional findings 
. . . . [or] legislative history.” Id. at 1362 (citing EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 231-232 & 
n.3 (1983); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 755-56 (1982); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 277-79 (1981); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 147 n.1 
(1971); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 298-300, 303-04 (1964)). 
115.  2 F.3d at 1363, 1368 (noting that when congressional findings of a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce are present, “[p]ractically speaking, such findings almost always end 
the matter,” but declining to reach the question whether the legislation at issue might be 
sustained if accompanied by “adequate Congressional findings or legislative history”). 
116.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562; see Coenen, supra note 2, at 1659-61; Robert F. Nagel, The Future of 
Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 652 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Public Deliberation, 
Affirmative Action, and the Supreme Court, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1179, 1194 n.73 (1996). STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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exercise its independent judgment in deciding whether a federal law had 
substantial effects on interstate commerce, and that congressional findings 
were only useful insofar as they aided the Court in making that judgment.
117 
The Court drove this point home in Morrison. In that case, Congress 
provided extensive hearing records and documentation in support of the 
assertion that the Violence Against Women Act’s civil cause of action for 
gender-based violence would have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.
118 The Supreme Court, however, dismissed these findings as 
irrelevant to the Commerce Clause analysis and reemphasized that the Court 
was to make an independent judgment regarding a statute’s effects on 
interstate commerce.
119 After the Supreme Court’s decisions in Lopez and 
Morrison, it is not clear whether congressional findings have any significant 
effect on the probability that a purported congressional exercise of the 
Commerce Clause power will be upheld.
120 But it is plain that the Supreme 
Court could have adopted, and may yet adopt, an approach more similar to the 
one that the Fifth Circuit adopted in Lopez, and that Justice Souter appeared to 
endorse in his Morrison dissent. 
Judicially imposed evidence and analysis requirements are typically 
explained and justified with reference to two interrelated purposes. First, the 
government’s decision-making record may provide the reviewing court with 
more substantive information about the strength of the government’s interest, 
which the court can use to make its own independent assessment of whether 
the policy ought to be upheld. In other words, explanation requirements may 
be a way of mandating information transmission from the government to the 
court.
121 Second, explanation requirements may assure the court that the 
government actually has made a decision on the basis of some degree of 
information and expertise. Even if the reviewing court cannot confidently 
 
117.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563. 
118.  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614; id. at 628-36 & nn.2-9 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
119.  Id. at 614-15 (majority opinion); Coenen, supra note 2, at 1661-62. 
120.  See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 20-22 (2005); id. at 53-55 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); 
Coenen, supra note 2, at 1661-65 & n.373. 
121.  This appears to be how the Supreme Court majority opinions in Lopez and Morrison view 
the relevance of congressional findings. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-15 (stating that “the 
existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality 
of Commerce Clause legislation” and rejecting congressional findings that rely on an 
“unworkable” method of reasoning); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63 (suggesting that 
congressional findings, though not required, may be useful in Commerce Clause cases when 
such findings “would enable [the Court] to evaluate the legislative judgment that the 
activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such 
substantial effect was visible to the naked eye”). STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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assess the government’s explanation on the merits, it may be able to use the 
quality of that explanation to distinguish informed decisionmaking from 
uninformed decisionmaking. A more cynical alternative to these two 
explanations is that reviewing courts actually care little about the quality of the 
legislative record, and judicial statements (positive or negative) about the 
quality of the record are usually no more than makeweights.
122 
I do not deny any of these possibilities. What I want to suggest is that, in 
addition to whatever other functions may be served by judicial attention to the 
quality and quantity of the legislative record, this approach may also raise 
legislative enactment costs. Holding hearings, commissioning and presenting 
studies, providing evidence and explanation, instructing staffers to prepare 
elaborate analyses, and related activities all consume time and resources that 
could have been devoted to other things.
123 The greater the quantity and 
quality of the supporting materials, the more time and resources will typically 
be required. Thus, the more significance a reviewing court attaches to the 
legislative record for a given decision, the greater the enactment costs of that 
decision are likely to be. This is true whether the requisite work is done by the 
legislators and their staffs or by outside interest groups, as they all face 
significant opportunity costs for this use of their time and resources. 
If this is true, and if the other conditions for the enactment cost argument 
hold, then implicit or explicit judicial demands for a high-quality legislative 
record may help implement constitutional values, independent of any other 
function these requirements might perform. To put the point as starkly as 
possible, even if courts learn no verifiable information from the content of a 
legislative record, the mere fact that the enacting legislative coalition produced 
that record can provide the court with useful information about the strength of 
the government’s interest. Again, I am not claiming that legislative record 
requirements perform no function other than increasing enactment costs, nor 
do I claim that influencing enactment costs is the conscious purpose of those 
courts that emphasize the quality of the legislative record. What I do argue is 
that when courts condition approval of constitutionally problematic legislation 
on the presence of costly legislative history, this has the effect of raising the 
government’s enactment costs, and this in turn may perform the screening 
function described in Part I. The positive and normative debates over these 
sorts of doctrinal approaches are therefore incomplete if the effect on 
enactment costs is neglected. 
 
122.  See Coenen, supra note 2, at 1688-89, 1845-47; Mark Tushnet, Subconstitutional Constitutional 
Law: Supplement, Sham, or Substitute?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1871, 1871-76 (2001). 
123.  See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 
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2.  Penalizing “Bad” Legislative History: Impermissible Statements of 
Government Motive 
The preceding examples involved cases in which the reviewing court 
rewarded legislators for providing “good” (but costly) explanations for 
constitutionally problematic decisions. There are also cases in which the courts 
appear to punish legislators for advancing “bad” explanations—that is, 
providing “bad” legislative history—for their policy choices. In addition to 
whatever other effects that judicial punishment of such explanations might 
have, this approach increases the government’s enactment costs insofar as the 
judicially disfavored statements in the legislative history are politically 
beneficial to the relevant government decisionmakers. 
Judicial attention to disfavored explanations for government policy choices 
is particularly notable in the context of the First Amendment’s religion clauses. 
A persistent difficulty in enforcing both the Free Exercise Clause and the 
Establishment Clause, at least on their prevailing modern understandings, is 
the problem of distinguishing impermissible religious favoritism or hostility 
from permissible recognition of, or permissible interference with, religious 
beliefs or practices. When does recognition become favoritism? How do we 
know when the government has crossed the line separating legitimate policies 
that happen to burden certain religious practices from illegitimate policies that 
suppress or penalize particular religious beliefs?
124 
One approach that courts have used, when trying to draw these 
distinctions, is to look not only at the challenged government enactment, but 
also at what its supporters have to say about it. In numerous Establishment 
Clause cases, reviewing courts have looked beyond the challenged enactment 
itself to the rhetoric of the responsible government officials. Rhetoric in the 
legislative history (before or after enactment) suggesting hostility to religious 
minorities, or a desire to privilege particular religions or religion generally, may 
render the enactment more vulnerable to constitutional invalidation on 
Establishment Clause grounds.
125 This approach also crops up in other 
 
124.  See J ESSE  H.  CHOPER,  SECURING  RELIGIOUS  LIBERTY:  PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL 
INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES (1995); Daniel O. Conkle, Toward a General 
Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 1113 (1988); Noah Feldman, From 
Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90 CAL.  L.  REV.  673 
(2002). 
125.  See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005); id. at 881, 883-84 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); id. at 597 (Powell, J., concurring); 
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56-60 (1985); id. at 65 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 74-79 STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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constitutional contexts—most notably the First Amendment’s Free Speech 
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, as well as 
other areas.
126 
Judicial attention to legislative history that evinces a desire to support or 
suppress religious practice, or some other disfavored purpose, is 
controversial.
127 Several possible justifications for such attention are prominent 
in the literature and the case law. First, and most obviously, if one purpose of 
the First Amendment’s religion clauses is smoking out bad government 
motives, legislative statements may be highly probative. A closely related 
argument turns on the claim that the primary harms the religion clauses are 
designed to prevent are symbolic or psychological: the feeling of exclusion or 
marginalization, along with the social divisiveness that may arise as a 
consequence of such feelings.
128 If so, then government rhetoric is 
constitutionally relevant because such rhetoric directly affects the social 
meaning and understanding of legislative acts.
129 Even if legislative rhetoric 
 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 253-55 (1982); 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 453 (1961). Some Justices also appear to ascribe 
significance to the rhetoric of enacting legislators in determining whether the government 
has violated the Free Exercise Clause by targeting specific religious beliefs or practices for 
disfavored treatment. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 
U.S. 520, 540-42 (1993) (Kennedy, J.) (plurality opinion). 
126.  E.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719 (2000); id. at 768-69 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228-32 
(1985); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973); see Paul Brest, The 
Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585, 589-94 
(1975); Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional 
Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95; Coenen, supra note 2, at 1755-72; John Hart Ely, 
Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE  L.J.  1205 (1970); 
Richard L. Hasen, Bad Legislative Intent, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 843; Elena Kagan, Private Speech, 
Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 413 (1996). 
127.  See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 558-59 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment); Edwards, 482 U.S. at 636-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Palmer v. 
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968); 
McGowan, 366 U.S. at 466, 468-69 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); United States v. 
Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 299 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting); cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983) (arguing against the use of legislative 
history in statutory interpretation generally). 
128.  A similar claim might be made regarding at least one of the purposes of the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
129.  See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 75-76 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); B. Jessie Hill, 
Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic Critique of the Endorsement Test, 104 
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does not independently influence the social meaning of government acts, it 
may be probative as to how such acts are understood in the relevant 
community. 
The enactment cost perspective developed in Part I does not directly engage 
the validity of these claims. Instead, it suggests a possible alternative or 
additional function that judicial penalization of “bad legislative history” may 
perform. One reason government decisionmakers often advertise the religious 
motivations behind a particular legislative or administrative act is because it is 
politically advantageous to do so. In many communities, legislators have an 
incentive to demonstrate their piety not only through rhetoric, and not only 
through government action, but through the conjunction of the two. The value 
of religiously inspired legislation is greatly reduced, however, if the enacting 
legislators are not allowed to invoke their support of that legislation as 
evidence of their religious convictions without jeopardizing the validity of the 
enactment itself. Forcing the legislators to abstain from pro- or anti-religious 
rhetoric when promulgating a constitutionally problematic decision may 
perform a screening function similar to that associated with doctrines that 
impose additional costly requirements. Here, instead of adding an enactment 
cost, the courts subtract an enactment benefit, which amounts to the same 
thing. 
To illustrate, imagine that a state legislature is considering a bill that would 
prohibit businesses from opening on Sundays.
130 The law will produce some 
benefits, both religious and secular. A Sunday closing law may provide a sense 
of religious solidarity for the Christian community, and it may encourage 
prayer and reflection. Designating one day a week as a mandatory holiday 
might also have a variety of non-religious benefits, and picking the day that 
most residents would customarily want to take off anyway is a sensible thing to 
do. On the other hand, a Sunday closing law will also produce costs. Some of 
these costs implicate the values and interests that the Establishment Clause, on 
some plausible accounts, is designed to safeguard. By affirming the significance 
of the Christian Sabbath and facilitating Christian religious worship, the 
Sunday closing law may place disproportionate burdens (both material and 
psychological) on non-Christians, which in turn could increase divisiveness 
along religious lines.
131 
 
130.  See, e.g., McGowan, 366 U.S. 420. 
131.  As was the case with the Equal Protection Clause example, see supra text accompanying 
notes 30-31, this Article ascribes a set of purposes to the Establishment Clause in order to 
develop the example, but the Article does not take a position on whether this is in fact the 
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A rational state legislator, acting in good faith, will try to balance these 
considerations. This legislator will also recognize that the political benefits 
from supporting the Sunday closing law are greater if she can claim, openly 
and adamantly, that she supported the law primarily out of a desire to honor 
and promote Christian religious beliefs. For purposes of developing the 
argument, let us take off the table the argument that by engaging in such 
rhetoric the legislator would alter the social meaning of the law so that it would 
have a more marginalizing and divisive effect. Let us further assume that there 
is nothing inherently objectionable about a desire to promote Christian 
solidarity and to encourage Sunday prayer, as long as other religious or secular 
groups do not suffer any significant harm. This assumption is obviously 
contestable, but I want to put to one side the argument that judicial attention 
to legislative rhetoric is appropriate because religious motivations are 
inherently illegitimate. 
The legislator will support the Sunday closing law if the benefits, political 
and otherwise, exceed the costs. Suppose, however, that the legislator 
undervalues the costs associated with the marginalization of non-Christian 
citizens and the religious divisiveness that a Sunday closing law may foster. 
Again, I am assuming a legislator who is not hostile to these interests—she just 
does not care about them enough to strike the constitutional balance 
appropriately if left to her own devices. Finally, suppose that the reviewing 
court is not terribly good at evaluating the actual impact of the Sunday closing 
law. On this predictive question, the legislature is likely to have better 
information than the court. 
This is simply another manifestation of the scenario developed in Part I. As 
the discussion in that Part demonstrated, the reviewing court might improve 
outcomes by raising the cost to the legislator of enacting the new law relative to 
retaining the status quo. One way for the court to do this is to make clear that 
it will uphold the Sunday closing law if but only if the enacting legislators 
abstain from making statements to the effect that they support the legislation 
because it recognizes and promotes Christian religious practices. The court 
might go further, requiring members of the enacting coalition expressly to 
disclaim any religious purpose for the law. Such a doctrinal approach would 
reduce the benefits legislators could expect to realize from passing the 
legislation. Those benefits, including the benefits associated with promoting 
observance of the Christian Sabbath, would not disappear, but the political 
benefits to enacting legislators would decrease because these legislators would 
not be able to point to their support of this legislation as evidence of their 
piety. By reducing legislators’ ability to claim credit for certain popular aspects 
of the Sunday closing legislation, the legislation’s political benefits will fall 
relative to its costs. This effect can bring the legislators’ preferences more STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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closely into line with the reviewing court’s view of the appropriate 
constitutional balance.
132 
One appealing feature of this form of enactment cost strategy is that it may 
entail fewer deadweight costs than other approaches. Compelling a legislature 
to devote scarce resources to preparing elaborate records may divert resources 
from other socially valuable activities. Telling legislators that they must abstain 
from certain kinds of rhetoric may have considerably fewer social costs. I do 
not want to push this point too far, however. If we maintain our assumption 
that there is nothing inherently wrong with facilitating Christian worship, then 
there may be a social cost associated with preventing legislators from taking 
full credit for certain aspects of their policy decisions. More generally, 
encouraging politicians to be disingenuous may be socially costly, both by 
encouraging cynicism and by giving political leaders an incentive to expend 
resources in order to make sure their true motives and interests are 
communicated to relevant constituency groups in some other way. 
The enactment cost argument for penalizing bad legislative history is not 
mutually exclusive with other justifications for this approach, such as the belief 
that statements by government officials shape the social meaning of 
government policy. But the enactment cost argument is independent of these 
other arguments. One might believe that the only constitutionally relevant 
consideration is the effect of the law, not the intent of the legislators, yet still 
 
132.  Although I have categorized enactment cost strategies that emphasize legislative history into 
those that reward “good” legislative history and those that punish “bad” legislative history, 
it would also be possible to classify these approaches in terms of whether they focus on the 
resource cost of the legislative history (where the enactment cost derives from the diversion 
of resources to producing the legislative history materials) or on the content of the 
legislative history (where the enactment cost derives from the political cost of foregoing, or 
including, certain types of substantive statements in the legislative history). In other words, 
what I have called “good” legislative history might be better characterized as “resource-
intensive” legislative history, while what I have called “bad” legislative history might be 
better characterized as “politically advantageous position-taking.” I use the “good” and 
“bad” classifications because these seem to track the judicial treatment of the different types 
of materials—resource-intensive explanations are perceived and characterized as good and 
useful efforts to establish the need for a particular enactment, while particular forms of 
politically advantageous position-taking, such as those discussed in the text, are viewed as 
evidence of bad motives. But this need not always be the case: if a court upholds legislation 
only if the legislative history contains an affirmative statement, such as the explicit 
disavowal of a religious motive for a Sunday closing law, then this might better be 
categorized as “rewarding good legislative history,” even though the focus is on content 
rather than resource cost. And, of course, the resource cost and content effects may 
sometimes both be present, and may cut in opposite directions, as when a lengthy and 
detailed analysis of the justifications for a controversial enactment also contains politically 
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reach the conclusion that penalizing bad legislative history is an appropriate 
instrumental strategy for ensuring that those laws that are enacted are more 
likely to satisfy an ideal constitutional balancing test. 
D. Doctrinal Uncertainty 
Few judges or commentators have many kind words for unpredictability in 
constitutional doctrine.
133 Indeed, the social costs of unpredictability are well 
known. When it is difficult to anticipate how a constitutional test will apply in 
different circumstances, the result may be underdeterrence (if parties have an 
incentive to push constitutional limits and courts are reluctant to sanction 
government conduct ex post)
134 or overdeterrence (the “chilling effect” that can 
arise if parties are concerned about incurring serious penalties if their behavior 
is ruled unconstitutional).
135 Unpredictability may also increase litigation costs, 
and some fear that insufficiently clear and determinate doctrine will allow—
indeed, encourage—judges to make constitutional rulings according to their 
subjective preferences regarding outcomes in individual cases.
136 While there 
are many defenders of unpredictable legal standards, they do not typically 
defend unpredictability as such. Rather, they extol the virtues of flexible, 
context-sensitive doctrinal tests, and insist that the benefits of clear, predictable 
 
133.  See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting 
Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 537 
(1993); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991, 
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constitutional doctrines come at too steep a price.
137 Many would therefore 
view Mark Tushnet’s conclusion that “clarity is a virtue that cannot be valued 
too much in constitutional law”
138 as only a slight exaggeration. 
Despite this, many areas of constitutional law are rife with uncertainty. 
Consider, as one of a number of possible illustrations, dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine, especially with respect to state laws that do not overtly or 
intentionally discriminate against out-of-state entities. While state laws that 
facially discriminate against out-of-state entities are presumed to be 
unconstitutional unless the state interest is compelling,
139 even a statute that 
does not facially discriminate against interstate commerce may run afoul of the 
dormant Commerce Clause if “the burden imposed on such commerce is 
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”
140 This may sound 
straightforward, but in practice the application of dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine is confusing and unpredictable.
141 The result of this uncertainty, many 
argue, is that states are deterred from engaging in a variety of regulatory 
activities.
142 
Another example of an area of constitutional law plagued by uncertainty 
concerns the use of race as a factor in drawing legislative districts. In Shaw v. 
Reno,
143 the Supreme Court invalidated North Carolina’s districting plan on the 
grounds that the boundaries of a majority-African American district were so 
bizarre that the plan impermissibly discriminated on the basis of race, in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Among the numerous criticisms 
 
137.  See Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985); Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
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directed at the Shaw opinion was the argument that the Court’s “I know it 
when I see it”
144 approach was a recipe for confusion. Under this uncertain 
standard, two critics wryly observed, “each decade will inaugurate a new 
impressionistic course of litigation, presumably following the developmental 
structure of the animal kingdom, over the proper shape of districts . . . . 
[S]nakeline districts would clearly fail, but ‘bug-splats’ might stay on the 
margin, and even amoeboid- or octopus-shaped districts may survive.”
145 
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have generally failed to add much clarity 
or certainty to the doctrine.
146 
Many areas of constitutional doctrine are, of course, unclear at the moment 
that the courts first start to engage with the relevant problems. Often the 
doctrine becomes clearer over time, as a body of precedents accumulates and 
the courts refine and clarify the nature of the tests they will apply.
147 But, as the 
dormant Commerce Clause, redistricting, and numerous other possible 
examples illustrate, some doctrinal areas stubbornly resist this sort of 
clarification. As noted above, the failure of courts to achieve greater doctrinal 
clarity over time is usually viewed as imposing significant social costs. 
Without minimizing the problems that doctrinal uncertainty can create, 
this Article’s analysis of enactment costs as a screening mechanism suggests a 
potential benefit to this sort of unpredictability. The argument goes something 
like this: the enactment of any legislation entails opportunity costs for the 
members of the enacting coalition, who bear these costs regardless of whether 
the legislation ultimately goes into effect. Enacting legislators may accrue some 
benefits that are independent of whether a statute is upheld, but in most cases 
a sizeable fraction of the political and ideological benefits of passing legislation 
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will be realized only if the legislative proposal becomes and remains valid law. 
When any individual legislator decides whether she will invest effort in passing 
a statute, she will compare the costs and benefits of enactment. The legislator 
will discount the present value of these benefits, however, if she cannot be sure 
whether the courts will uphold the statute. The less likely the courts are to 
sustain the statute, the lower the net benefits to the legislator of passing it. 
Therefore, as the probability of judicial acceptance drops, the higher the 
anticipated benefits of the statute would have to be to justify enacting it. 
Because of this, doctrinal unpredictability is another way that courts can 
raise the legislature’s enactment costs. In the enactment cost manipulation 
strategies discussed in previous sections, judicial doctrine increased enactment 
costs by conditioning approval of a constitutionally problematic policy on 
whether the government engaged in some costly activity—spending money, 
devoting time or political capital to more careful drafting or providing the right 
kind of legislative history, and so forth. In contrast, doctrinal uncertainty 
makes judicial approval probabilistic rather than conditional. But probabilistic 
approval, like conditional approval, can lower the expected net benefits of 
constitutionally problematic actions without precluding the possibility of such 
actions altogether. 
This is simply a restatement of the “chilling effect” criticism of doctrinal 
unpredictability: uncertainty about whether a statute will be upheld reduces 
the expected net benefits of passing the statute (relative to the net benefits in 
the case in which the statute would certainly be upheld), but does not change 
the costs of enactment.
148 Of course, doctrinal uncertainty increases the expected 
benefits of enacting a statute when the comparison is to a world in which the 
statute is certain to be struck down.
149 The important point is that, by varying 
the probability with which a given statute will be upheld, the court can vary the 
effective enactment costs associated with that statute. Doing so will have a 
screening effect, because the legislature is more likely to invest the time and 
effort in passing a statute of uncertain constitutionality if the benefit of the 
statute to the enacting coalition is high. 
To illustrate with a stylized example, imagine a state legislature considering 
a statute that would incidentally burden interstate commerce. Imagine that the 
enactment cost for this statute, to a representative legislator in the potential 
enacting coalition, is 3 units of utility. Let us suppose further that there is a 
20% ex ante probability that this statute will have a very large positive effect on 
legitimate state interests; if so, the statute is worth 10 units of utility to the 
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enacting legislature. There is also an 80% probability, however, that the 
benefits will turn out to be more modest, worth only 4 units of utility to the 
legislature. Let us also assume that the legislature knows whether the statute 
has high or moderate benefits before enacting it. Because the value of the 
statute (4 or 10) exceeds the enactment cost (3) even in the case in which the 
statute has lower benefits, the legislator would always prefer enactment, absent 
other considerations. 
Now, consider the problem from the reviewing court’s perspective. Assume 
that the court views the legislature’s interests as legitimate, but the court also 
believes that the state legislature systematically undervalues the constitutional 
interest in preserving an unfettered national market. Stipulate that the statute 
in question would impinge on this constitutional interest, and the court views 
this impingement as imposing a cost equal to 5 units of utility. Furthermore, 
the state legislature does not internalize this utility loss. Thus, if the court 
upholds the statute, it would receive 5 net units of utility (10 minus 5) if the 
statute has high benefits, while the court’s payoff from upholding the statute 
would be -1 (4 minus 5) if the benefits of the statute are more modest. 
If the court knew the true benefits of the statute, it could condition its 
ruling on that information. But the court may not be able to make that 
assessment. If the uninformed court had to choose between upholding the 
statute and striking it down, the court would uphold the statute. The reason is 
that the expected value of the statute to the court is 0.2 units of utility: there is 
a 20% chance that the statute is worth 5, and an 80% chance that it is worth -1. 
The 0.2 units of expected utility the court gets if it upholds the statute are 
better than the zero expected utility the court gets if it strikes the statute down. 
The state legislature, of course, will pass the statute regardless of whether the 
benefits are high or low, given that it can anticipate a net utility payoff of 1 (4 
minus 3) if the statute’s benefits are low and 7 (10 minus 3) if those benefits are 
high. 
Now suppose that the court can commit in advance to an “unpredictable” 
legal doctrine. In particular, suppose that under this doctrine, there is a 50% 
chance that the statute in question would be upheld, but there is also a 50% 
chance that the court would decide it violates the dormant Commerce Clause. 
In this case, the legislator’s expected utility from passing a statute with high 
benefits is 2 units of utility: the legislator bears a cost of 3 up front, and has a 
50% chance of realizing a gain of 10. So, if the statute has high value, the 
legislator still views it as worth passing, even though there is a 50% chance that 
the court will strike it down. If the statute has more modest benefits, however, 
the legislator would not be willing to pass the statute because the net utility 
payoff of doing so is -1: passing the statute requires paying an enactment cost 
of 3 in exchange for a 50% chance of realizing a gain of 4. STEPHENSON OP  10/14/2008  11:21:15 AM 
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Because the only statutes that reach the court under these conditions are 
those that have high benefits, the court would prefer ex post to uphold the 
statute in all cases. By assumption, the court cannot do so because it has 
committed itself to applying a doctrine that will invalidate the statute half the 
time.
150 The court’s commitment to this unpredictable legal doctrine gives it an 
expected utility payoff of 0.5: in the 80% of cases in which the statute has only 
moderate benefits, the court gets its status quo payoff of zero; in the 10% of 
cases in which the statute has high benefits but the court strikes it down, the 
court also receives a payoff of zero; in the 10% of cases in which the statute has 
high benefits and the court upholds it, the court realizes a net utility payoff of 
5. Thus, the expected utility to the court when it commits to an unpredictable 
doctrine (0.5) is greater than its expected utility payoff when it simply makes 
its best (predictable) choice ex post (0.2). 
The reason for this is that the uncertainty of judicial doctrine has a more 
powerful deterrent effect on the legislature for low-value statutes than for 
high-value statutes. Running the risk of judicial reversal is more worthwhile to 
the legislature when the statute has a higher value. In the stylized example 
discussed above, the court’s best choice would be to commit to striking down 
legislative enactments with a 25% probability. A 75% chance that a statute is 
upheld is just small enough that the legislature would not enact a statute unless 
it has high rather than low benefits. So, the court’s expected utility would be 
0.75 (the 20% probability of a high-value statute times the 75% probability the 
statute is upheld times 5 net units of utility)—more than three times higher 
than the 0.2 units of expected utility the court would realize if it followed the ex 
post optimal strategy of upholding the statute 100% of the time. 
The foregoing argument implies judicial behavior that appears perverse, at 
least at first blush. The only cases the court hears are those in which the 
statute’s constitutional costs are outweighed by legitimate government 
interests, yet the court strikes down a large number of them. Furthermore, the 
court’s decisions as to which statutes it will uphold and which it will strike 
down seem totally haphazard—which, in fact, they are, at least in the stylized 
version of the argument. An ex post evaluation might well conclude that the 
court’s behavior was inexplicable and unjustifiable. Such a conclusion, 
however, might be too quick. If the court behaved differently—for example, if 
it were willing to uphold all statutes in the relevant class—the mix of statutes 
that the legislature would enact might change considerably. As the above 
example illustrates, such a change could lead to results that are systematically 
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worse for the court when considered in the aggregate. Thus, doctrinal 
unpredictability, whatever its other costs, may be useful as a way to raise 
legislative enactment costs relative to anticipated statutory benefits. 
The above argument is subject to a number of important qualifications and 
limitations. Foremost among these is the fact that the argument works only if 
the court can credibly commit itself to a doctrinal framework that is 
unpredictable at the point of application. Put another way, the court must be 
able to commit itself to striking down some number of legislative enactments, 
despite the fact that, ex post, the court would prefer that these enactments be 
upheld. The credible commitment problem applies to most versions of the 
enactment cost strategy, but the problem may be particularly acute in the 
context of a commitment to strike down some proportion of legislative 
enactments at random. 
A second important qualification is that introducing uncertainty as to 
whether the court will uphold a legislative enactment does not always improve 
the court’s expected utility, even when the four assumptions described in Part I 
hold. For one thing, the court must correctly calibrate the degree of doctrinal 
uncertainty. For another, even though doctrinal uncertainty improved the 
court’s utility in the stylized example developed above, it would be easy to 
construct an example in which the court does just as well, or better, by always 
upholding or always rejecting a given type of legislation. The desirability of the 
strategy of doctrinal unpredictability depends on the probability distribution of 
the possible statutory benefits. Speaking informally, some degree of doctrinal 
unpredictability is likely to be desirable when there is a high probability that 
the statute has low value for the legislature and negative value for the court, 
but there is some probability that the statute has sufficiently high value that its 
ex ante net expected value from the court’s perspective is positive. In this set of 
cases, the court can do better by rejecting statutes at random with some 
positive probability, as this will deter the legislature from passing the statute 
unless it is high-value. 
Finally, the costs of unpredictable constitutional doctrine may often 
outweigh any screening benefits that unpredictability may create.
151 Just as the 
deadweight social costs of judicial doctrines that increase enactment costs 
directly may outweigh the benefits of such doctrines, this may also be the case 
for doctrinal approaches that commit the court to some degree of 
unpredictability. That said, understanding the potential benefits of 
unpredictability as a screening device may provide a partial explanation for 
why certain areas of judicial doctrine are more resistant to clarification and 
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consistency than would otherwise seem optimal. The courts may recognize the 
virtues of predictability and clarity, but they may also see virtues in keeping the 
legislature a bit uncertain about which policies will pass constitutional muster, 
especially when the best clear rule the court could come up with would allow 
the legislature to promulgate large numbers of policies that the court, if fully 
informed, would view as unconstitutional. 
conclusion 
This Article has advanced two central claims. First, Part I argued that under 
certain conditions, reviewing courts may implement constitutional guarantees 
more effectively by crafting doctrines that raise the costs to government 
decisionmakers of enacting constitutionally problematic policies. When the 
conditions described in Part I are satisfied, this enactment cost strategy has 
distinct advantages over both case-by-case balancing approaches and absolute, 
categorical rules that designate certain types of government action as 
prohibited or permitted. Second, Part II attempted to show that, while few if 
any judicial doctrines are explicitly and consciously designed with the primary 
purpose of raising legislative enactment costs, many doctrines in fact have that 
effect. Thus, the enactment cost approach to judicial regulation of 
constitutionally problematic government activity may be more widespread 
than it would at first appear, and certain doctrinal approaches may be justified 
on enactment cost grounds even if these doctrines were not developed 
explicitly with that purpose in mind. At the very least, federal courts already 
have the doctrinal resources to implement such a strategy, if they choose to do 
so. 
The fact that an enactment cost strategy may be effective under some 
circumstances does not mean, however, that existing doctrines are well suited 
to this function. Indeed, given that few if any existing doctrines were designed 
with the express purpose of manipulating legislative enactment costs, it would 
be quite surprising if it turned out that all these doctrines served this function 
well. Part of the point of this Article is to suggest how consideration of the 
screening functions served by judicial enactment cost manipulation may lead to 
productive suggestions for doctrinal reform. Such considerations are obscured, 
however, by adherence to the view that constitutional doctrine is only about 
marking out the boundaries of permissible government action rather than 
about creating incentives that protect constitutional values indirectly. 